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Constitutional Review of Building Codes and
Zoning Ordinances Applied to Parochial Schools:
City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church
I. INTRODUCTION
In City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church,' the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held that when a parochial school is closed
because its sponsoring church financially cannot comply with
school building code standards,2 the building code burdens the
congregants' constitutionally protected religious freedom.3 Thus,
1. 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982).
2. In 1974, the city of Sumner adopted the UNIFORM BUILDING CODE (Int'l Confer-
ence of Bldg. Officials 1973 ed.) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING CODE]. First Baptist
Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 11, 639 P.2d at 1364 (plurality opinion). The building did not
meet the code's fire safety standards for schools. Id. at 20, 639 P.2d at 1369 (Dolliver, J.,
dissenting). Other building code violations included inadequacies in floor space, ventila-
tion, and restroom facilities. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " Although WASH. CONST.
amend. XXXIV, amending WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11, provides that "no one shall be
molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion .... " First Baptist
Church apparently did not rest upon a construction of the Washington Constitution. See
intra note 155.
The plurality stated that in addition to the fundamental right to religious freedom,
the congregants had a fundamental right to send their children to a church-operated
school. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 5, 7, 639 P.2d at 1361, 1362. This right has
developed in a piecemeal manner, through cases not necessarily involving parochial edu-
cation. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1923) (parents have the right to
direct their children's upbringing, including foreign language study); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (parents' child-rearing rights include the right to
educate their children in a parochial school); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-
99 (1927) (parents' child-rearing rights include right to direct linguistic and cultural
aspects of their child's education); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14, 232-33
(1972) (parents have a fundamental right and interest in directing the religious upbring-
ing of their children). See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-504
(1977) (recognizing freedom of choice in family matters as a fundamental liberty);
Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1301 n.29 (Alaska 1982) (federal
constitution gives parents the right to educate their children in a parochial school); State
v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 214, 351 N.E.2d 750, 769 (1976) (parents have a funda-
mental right to direct their children's education). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
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the court ruled that when this financial burden is established,
the building code, as applied to the parochial school, is invalid
unless the code can withstand strict judicial scrutiny.4
The court also held that when a City Planning Commis-
sion's refusal to issue a special use permit prevents a church
from operating its school in the church's residential district loca-
tion, the Commission's application of the city's zoning ordi-
nance infringes upon the congregants' religious freedom.6 Thus,
the court ruled that the zoning ordinance, as applied to the
parochial school, also is invalid unless the denial of the permit
could withstand strict judicial scrutiny.7
The First Baptist Church court should not have required
strict scrutiny of either the building code or the zoning ordi-
nance applications. In reaching its decision, the court incorrectly
analyzed Supreme Court decisions construing the free exercise
clause,8 and drew mistaken parallels between the two Sumner
ordinances and laws that the Supreme Court has identified as
burdening religious freedom.9 The court should have distin-
AND J. N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1055 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-13, at 882-84 (1978); id. §
15-21.
4. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 7-10, 639 P.2d at 1362-64. This strict scru-
tiny standard is discussed infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. The First Baptist
Church court did not reach a majority opinion. See infra note 34. However, Justice Utter
concurred with the plurality's use of a strict scrutiny standard of review. 97 Wash. 2d at
14-15, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J., concurring). With Justice Utter's concurrence, a
majority of the justices agreed that if a financial burden were established, the building
code would burden the congregants' religious freedom and would have to undergo strict
scrutiny. The majority apparently regarded the financial burden as established, although
the case was remanded to the trial court for determination of that question. See infra
note 162. In this Note, the combined holdings of Justice Utter and the plurality will be
referred to as the holding of the court.
5. SUMNER, WASH. CITY CODE tit. 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ZONING ORDINANCE].
The zoning ordinance forbids certain "special property uses" in the R-1 (residential) dis-
trict in which the Church is located unless authorized by a "special permit" issued by the
City Planning Commission. ZONING ORDINANCE, supra, §§ 11.16.020(a)(9), .180(a)(1).
These "special property uses" include churches and public, private, and parochial
schools. Id., § 11.16.180(a)(1). The Church applied for and was denied a special use per-
mit. 97 Wash. 2d at 17-18, 639 P.2d at 1368 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
6. As with the building code, a majority of the court agreed that if the zoning ordi-
nance prevented the Church's school from operating in the Church's basement, the zon-
ing ordinance would burden the congregants' religious freedom. First Baptist Church, 97
Wash. 2d at 7-10, 639 P.2d at 1362-64 (plurality opinion); id. at 14-15, 639 P.2d at 1366
(Utter, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 7-10, 639 P.2d at 1362-64.
8. See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
9. Id.
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guished between generally applicable laws such as Sumner's
building code and zoning ordinance that, in regulating the
peripheral aspects of religious conduct, incidentally make a reli-
gious practice less convenient or more expensive,"0 and laws that
effectively penalize the practice of religion." The court should
have required the trial court to review the Sumner ordinances
under the standards for laws that regulate the time, place, and
manner of exercising first amendment freedoms. 2 Using these
standards to review the ordinance would have provided a rea-
sonable approach to protecting religious practices from the
unnecessary, unintended effects of government regulation, and
would have helped insure that the generally applicable regula-
tions were applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. s
II. BACKGROUND
The First Baptist Church of Sumner ("Church") has oper-
ated for over seventy-five years at its present location in a resi-
dential section of Sumner, Washington. 4 In 1978 the church
membership, in accordance with their religious convictions,
established a church-operated school, the Washington Christian
Academy ("Academy").' 5 The Academy was housed in the
church basement.' 6
10. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 179-205 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 179-231 and accompanying text.
14. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 3, 639 P.2d at 1360.
15. Id. The Church viewed the Academy not merely as an educational facility, but
as an integral and inseparable part of the Church's educational ministry. Id. See infra
note 45. The congregants' beliefs concerning education are shared by many parents who
find that public education undermines their goals for guiding their children's religious
upbringing, both by inculcating values contrary to the parents' religious values, and also
by occupying the hours in the day that are available to integrate religious training into a
child's general education. See, e.g., City of Concord v. New Testament Baptist Church,
118 N.H. 56, 382 A.2d 377 (1978); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 198-212, 351
N.E.2d 750, 761-68 (1976).
It has been estimated that one million children in America currently are enrolled in
fundamentalist Christian schools, which are similar to the Academy. The schools report-
edly number approximately twenty thousand, with an estimated three additional schools
being established each day. Most of these schools are housed in churches, often in the
church basements. Solorzano, In New Christian Schools, Jesus is the Teacher, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., March 5, 1984, at 46.
16. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 3, 639 P.2d at 1360. The church basement
is a multipurpose area that the Church routinely uses for a variety of activities. The
Academy's students and staff had never exceeded fifty, while the number of persons
occupying the basement for other church activities often exceeds fifty. Brief of Appel-
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The City Building Inspector found that the church building
did not meet the city's building code requirements for schools,
including several of the code's safety standards.1 7 However, the
building previously had passed inspection for use as a church. 8
The Church attempted to comply with the building code by
making several improvements,' 9 but claimed it was unable to
finance the major structural improvements necessary to satisfy
lants at 4-5, City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982)'
[hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellants].
17. The city took an uncompromising position in enforcing the building code. First
Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 4, 639 P.2d at 1360. There was disagreement among the
court's members over whether the code's strict enforcement was necessary for safety.
Compare id. at 4, 639 P.2d at 1360-61 (plurality opinion) (several of the standards might
have been highly technical) with id. at 20, 639 P.2d at 1369 (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (the
code violations posed a health and safety hazard) and id. at 22, 639 P.2d at 1370 (Rosel-
lini, J., concurring in the dissent) (the code violations created a fire hazard).
18. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 3, 639 P.2d at 1360. The Church passed
inspection in June 1978, approximately one month before the July 1978 inspection in
which the building inspector determined that the Academy did not comply with the
code. Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 48-50, City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church,
No. 275198 (Pierce County, Wash. Super. Ct., June 22, 1979). The Church argued that
the June 1978 inspection established that the building was safe for use as a school. Brief
of Appellants, supra note 16, at 30. However, the Church was exempt from the building
code's standards for churches because its church use antedated the city's 1974 enactment
of the code. BUILDING CODE, supra note 2, § 104(g), provides that a building in existence
at the time of the code's passage may have its existing use continued if the use is not
dangerous to life. The building inspector stated at trial that the Church's compliance
was partly based upon its "grandfathered in" status, thereby indicating only that the
building posed no danger to life when used as a church. Verbatim Report of Proceedings,
supra, at 50. Because the nature of a building's use as a school differs from the nature of
its use as a church, a safe church building does not necessarily provide a safe school
building. Factors such as the hours of use, the activities conducted within the building,
and the age and number of the occupants all affect a building's safety. See generally
BUILDING CODE, supra note 2, passim.
The Church claimed that the building was in fact safe for use as a school, and that
because doctrinally the Academy was an integral part of the Church's ministry, the
Academy was a church use under the building code. Thus, the Church argued that the
Academy was exempt from the building code under the Church's grandfather clause
exemption. Brief of Appellants, supra note 16, at 14-23. See 97 Wash. 2d at 11-12, 639
P.2d at 1364-65. Similarly, the Church claimed that the Academy was covered by the
Church's grandfather exemption from the zoning ordinance. Brief of Appellants, supra
note 16, at 14-23. See 97 Wash. 2d at 12-13, 639 P.2d at 1365. The supreme court did not
decide these issues, leaving them to be decided when the case was remanded to the trial
court. Id. at 12-13, 639 P.2d at 1365. However, Justice Dolliver was correct in rejecting
these arguments. See 97 Wash. 2d at 21-22, 639 P.2d at 1369-70 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
Although doctrinally the Church and the Academy were indivisible, the laws' interpreta-
tions should be controlled by the character of the property's use, not by the nature of the
using organization. See infra note 218. Thus, although the Academy may have been part
of the Church as a matter of doctrine, the Church's doctrine should not control the
Academy's classification under the building code or the zoning ordinance.
19. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 3-4, 639 P.2d at 1360.
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the code's requirements.2 0
The Academy also violated the city's zoning ordinance. The
Church had not obtained the special use permit required to
operate a school in a residential neighborhood, 2 and also had
failed to provide the number of off-street parking spaces
required by the ordinance.2 2 The city sought, and was granted,
an injunction closing the Academy until the school complied
with the building code and the zoning ordinance.23 The injunc-
tion did not affect the building's use as a church.24
The trial court granted the injunction upon determining
that the church building did not meet the building code's
requirements for schools, without determining whether the vio-
lations actually posed a danger to health or safety.2" The trial
court rejected the Church's claim that, because the code was
enforced in an unnecessarily strict manner and imposed prohibi-
tive costs, the code unconstitutionally infringed upon the con-
gregants' religious freedom. 2 The trial court also rejected the
Church's claims that enforcing the zoning ordinance to close the
20. Id. at 4, 639 P.2d at 1360. The Church asserted its financial inability by affida-
vit. Affidavit of Larry D. Ferguson in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 3,
City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, No. 275198 (Pierce County, Wash. Super. Ct.,
June 14, 1979).
21. The Church had applied for a special use permit to operate the Academy in the
Church's basement. The City Planning Commission held a public hearing on the applica-
tion, at which the Church's neighbors voiced opposition to the school. No Church repre-
sentative attended the hearing. At the close of the meeting, the Commission denied the
Church's request for the permit. Brief of Respondent at 2, City of Sumner v. First Bap-
tist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Respon-
dent]. After the Church was notified that its request for a special use permit had been
rejected, the Church claimed that it had not received adequate notice of the first hear-
ing, and requested another hearing on the permit application. Id. at 3. The city sched-
uled a rehearing, but the Church withdrew its permit request, claiming that no permit
was required because all of the Church's activities, including the Academy, were ordinary
church activities. Id. The Church made no further attempt to obtain a special use per-
mit. Id.
22. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 4, 639 P.2d at 1360. The Church had only
one off-street parking space, while the zoning ordinance required that the Academy pro-
vide eight parking spaces. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 8, City of Sumner
v. First Baptist Church, No. 275198 (Pierce County, Wash. Super. Ct., Aug. 21, 1979).
23. The injunction forbade the Academy from operating until the Church complied
with the zoning ordinance by obtaining a special use permit and by providing additional
off-street parking, and until the Church conformed its building to the school building
code requirements. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 2-4, 639 P.2d at 1360.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 4, 8-10, 639 P.2d at 1361-63.
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Academy violated the free exercise clause2" and that the Acad-
emy was exempt from both the building code and the zoning
ordinance because of grandfather clause exemptions.2 The
Washington Court of Appeals, Division II, stayed the city from
enforcing the injunction pending appeal to the Washington
Supreme Court.2
III. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court
erred in rejecting the Church's first amendment claims.30 The
court remanded the case for further fact finding, stating that if
the "practical effect" of the building code were prohibitively to
increase the cost of operating the Academy, the code would inci-
dentally and indirectly infringe upon the Church's school minis-
try. 1 The supreme court held that, in that context, the code
would burden the congregants' religious freedom, requiring strict
scrutiny to test the code's validity.12 The court also required
strict scrutiny review of the zoning ordinance as applied to the
Academy if the "practical effect" of that law were to close the
27. The trial judge apparently rejected the Church's first amendment arguments on
a summary judgment motion, although he did not issue an order so stating. City of Sum-
ner v. First Baptist Church, No. 4268-I (Wash. App. Oct. 16, 1979) (order granting stay)
at 2-3.
28. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 4-5, 639 P.2d at 1361. The Sumn~r build-
ing code provides: "Buildings in existence at the time of the passage of this Code may
have their existing use or occupancy continued, if such use or occupancy was legal at the
time of the passage of this Code, provided such continued use is not dangerous to life."
BUILDING CODE, supra note 2, § 104(g). The Sumner zoning ordinance provides: "[T]he
lawful use of any building existing at the time of the adoption of the ordinance codified
in this title, although such use does not conform to the regulations specified by this
chapter for the district in which such building is located, may be continued." ZONING
ORDINANCE, supra note 5, § 11.20.020.
29. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, No. 4268-I (Wash. App. Oct. 16, 1979)
(order granting stay).
30. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 639 P.2d 1358, 1361-
62 (1982) (plurality opinion); id. at 15, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 5-10, 639 P.2d at 1361-64 (plurality opinion); id. at 14-15, 639 P.2d at 1366
(Utter, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 7-10, 639 P.2d at 1362-64 (plurality opinion); id. at 15, 639 P.2d at 1366
(Utter, J., concurring).
When a law burdens religious freedom, the law is not necessarily unconstitutional.
See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). A facially neutral regulation is uncon-
stitutional only if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (emphasis added). Whether the burden is undue is determined by a
strict scrutiny balancing test, unless the burden is only incidental. See infra notes 35-39
and accompanying text.
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Academy.33 The controversiality of the First Baptist Church




Under the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny balancing test, a
party claiming protection under the free exercise clause must
first prove that the challenged law has substantially burdened
the free exercise of his religion.38 If such a burden is shown36
33. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 7-10, 639 P.2d at 1362-64 (plurality opin-
ion); id. at 15, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J., concurring).
34. Chief Justice Brachtenbach and Justices Dimmick and Stafford joined Justice
Hicks' opinion to form the plurality. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 14, 639 P.2d
at 1365. Justice Utter concurred with the plurality's strict scrutiny balancing test
requirement. Id. at 14-15, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J., concurring). Justice Williams con-
curred in the result, but endorsed a less rigorous, intermediate standard of review. Id. at
15-16, 639 P.2d at 1366-67 (Williams, J., concurring). Justice Dore also concurred in the
result, but without expressing an opinion on the constitutional issues in the case. In his
opinion, the Academy was exempt from both the building code and the zoning ordinance
under the grandfather clauses. 97 Wash. 2d at 16, 639 P.2d at 1367 (Dore, J., concurring).
Justice Dolliver rejected the Church's constitutional claims and, thus, would not have
required strict scrutiny. In his opinion, the Academy also was not exempt under the
grandfather clauses. In any case, he believed the Academy was dangerous to life and thus
could not, under either of these theories, escape complying with the building code. Id. at
16-22, 639 P.2d at 1367-70 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). Justice Rosellini expressed no opin-
ion on the proper standard for reviewing the Church's first amendment claims. Because
he believed that the building code deficiencies posed a danger to life, Justice Rosellini
would not, under any theory, have excused the Academy from complying with the code.
Id. at 22-23, 639 P.2d at 1370 (Rosellini, J., concurring in the dissent of Dolliver, J.).
The court's internal distress is further illustrated by the extensive consideration the
court gave the case. The case first was argued before the court in October 1980. The case
was reargued in November 1981. 97 Wash. 2d at 3, 639 P.2d at 1360. On October 1, 1981,
the court requested an amicus curiae brief. This brief was submitted by Dean Fredric C.
Tausend and Professor David E. Engdahl of the University of Puget Sound School of
Law on November 2, 1981, and supported the Church's claims both on the grandfather
clause issues and on the first amendment issues. Brief Amicus Curiae, City of Sumner v.
First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982). The court finally decided the
case on February 4, 1982. 97 Wash. 2d at 1, 639 P.2d at 1358. Justice Hicks candidly
acknowledged that the court had "not been of one mind on the issues concerned." Id. at
3, 639 P.2d at 1360. Because the plurality opinion was drafted by a departing member of
the court and was issued after his departure, see id. at 14, 639 P.2d at 1365, expediency
may have played a role in ending the court's deliberations, possibly requiring a decision
sooner than was desired.
35. CONSTITuTiNL LAW, supra note 3, at 1061.
36. If no substantial burden on religious freedom is proved, then generally the stat-
ute need only be "rationally related" to a legitimate state interest. "[T]he law need not
be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particu-
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then the Court, under the second part of the test, determines
whether the state has demonstrated a compelling interest in
enforcing the challenged law.37 Unless the state shows this com-
lar legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9
(1974); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood,
699 F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983). This minimum rationality
standard has been particularly applicable when building codes and zoning ordinances
have been challenged, because the laws involve the public health, safety, and welfare,
and because of the Supreme Court's special deference to local communities' decisions
concerning building and zoning regulations. See, e.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl,
328 U.S. 80, 82-83 (1946) and infra note 219.
However, as to the administrative application of a zoning ordinance, the denial of a
special use permit must be based upon substantial evidence showing that granting the
permit would be detrimental to the community's health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare. State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee,
50 Wash. 2d 378, 382-86, 312 P.2d 195, 197-99 (1957). See also Pentagram Corp. v. City
of Seattle, 28 Wash. App. 219, 227-29, 622 P.2d 892, 896-97 (1981).
This Note argues that an intermediate time, place, and manner analysis should be
used when laws such as the Sumner ordinances incidentally affect religious practices,
even when there exists no substantial burden on religion that would justify strict scru-
tiny review. See infra notes 179-205 and accompanying text.
37. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). The Court also has referred
to this compelling interest as an "interest of the highest order." Id. See Commentary,
Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church Under Constitutional Scrutiny, 61 NEB. L. RaV. 74, 76
n.18 (1982).
The requirement that the state prove a compelling interest in the challenged law is a
characteristic of definitional balancing. Definitional balancing is an approach whereby
the asserted state interest is balanced against other values, such as the freedom to prac-
tice one's religion. The values are balanced without reference to the specific facts of the
case. See Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exer-
cise Clause, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1217, 1241-42. See also Note, Freedom of Religion and Sci-
ence Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515, 539 n.116 (1978).
Definitional balancing is distinguished from ad hoc balancing. Ad hoc balancing
involves assessing the facts of a case and balancing the state's interest against a party's
asserted interest. See Marcus, supra, at 1239-40; Schlag, An Attack on Categorical
Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REv. 671, 673-74 (1983). Although the
Court's compelling state interest test is, in theory, a definitional balancing approach, the
Court's test as applied also includes an element of ad hoc balancing. Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (1967); Marcus, supra, at 1242. See, e.g., Wis-
consin v. Yoder, where the Court said that a law burdening religious freedom was invalid
unless the state had an "interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the Free Exercise Clause." 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). See also United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-61 (1982) and Yoder at 233-34 (implying that the Court's
test involves, in part, an ad hoc balancing of interests).
The test the Washington Supreme Court adopted in First Baptist Church appears
more ad hoc than the United States Supreme Court's balancing test. The court employed
a fairly subjective "accommodation" standard that would involve a particularized assess-
ment of the importance of the religious interest in each case. See First Baptist Church,
97 Wash. 2d at 9-10, 639 P.2d at 1363-64 (plurality opinion); id. at 15, 639 P.2d at 1366
(Utter, J., concurring). But see id. at 8-9, 639 P.2d at 1362-63 (plurality opinion).
First Baptist Church
pelling interest, the law is invalid.38 Even when the state has a
compelling reason for the law, the law is invalid if the state
could accomplish its compelling objectives by alternative means
that would lessen the burden on religious freedom.39
The Washington Supreme Court held that if application of
the zoning ordinance prevented the Church from operating the
Academy in its building, the ordinance would burden the con-
gregants' religious freedom.40 The court also held that if the
financial effects of complying with the building code signifi-
cantly affected the Church's ability to operate the Academy, the
building code would substantially burden the congregants' reli-
gion. Thus, the Church would have satisfied the first part of the
balancing test with respect to both ordinances.41 Although the
court remanded the case for determination of whether these
burdens existed, the court's opinion treated the burdens as
established.2
In concluding that the Church satisfied the first part of the
test, the court had to make two determinations. First, the court
had to determine whether the activity for which the Church
claimed protection was religious in nature.43  Because the city
Because an ad hoc approach places courts in the position of assessing the impor-
tance of a value that the Constitution has already deemed fundamental, ad hoc balanc-
ing, particularly when religious freedoms are involved, has been criticized. See, e.g.,
Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327 (1969); Note, Free-
dom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515, 539 n.115
(1978). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657-60 (1974) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (criticizing ad hoc decisionmaking); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 11-12, 25, 35 (1959) (arguing that
cases should be decided by standards that transcend the case at hand).
38. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
39. Id. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 1061. This least restrictive means test
has two aspects. First, the regulation must be closely tailored to accomplish the compel-
ling state interest without unnecessarily regulating the religious conduct claiming protec-
tion. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 849; Giannella, supra note 37, at 1390.
Second, and a corollary to the first aspect, the state must accommodate the religious
practice claiming protection unless granting an exemption for all similarly situated reli-
gious practitioners would be unmanageable. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-
60 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 221-24, 228-29 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-09 (1963); Gian-
nella, supra note 37, at 1390. Cf. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652-54 (1981) (necessity of time, place, and manner regulation
must be assessed in terms of the hardship of making exceptions for all similarly situated
parties).
40. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 7-8, 639 P.2d at 1362-63.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 3-10, 639 P.2d at 1360-63; infra note 162.
43. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-14 (1981); First Baptist Church,
1984] 615
616 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 7:607
conceded that the Academy involved a religious practice," the
Academy satisfied the religious-nature requirement." The sec-
ond determination the court had to make was whether the zon-
ing ordinance and the building code burdened the congregants'
religious freedom."'
Determining whether a law burdens a religious activity
involves evaluating whether the law's effect on the religious
activity is substantial, 47 and also whether the effect on the reli-
gious activity should be treated as governmental action subject
to constitutional limitations." The court found that the impact
97 Wash. 2d at 14, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J., concurring) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972)).
Defining religion in the first amendment has itself presented the Court with a diffi-
cult problem. Several commentators have discussed the Court's treatment of this prob-
lem and have proposed approaches to defining religion. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §
14-6; Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. Rxv. 579;
Freeman, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71
GEo. L.J. 1519 (1983), and sources cited at 1519 n.3; Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Pro-
tection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593 (1964); Comment, Beyond Seeger/
Welsh: Redefining Religion Under the Constitution, 31 EMORY L.J. 973 (1982).
44. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 3, 639 P.2d at 1360. Although the city's
concession was qualified, the court treated the religious-nature issue as established. See
id. (plurality opinion); id. at 14-15, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J., concurring).
45. Even without the city's concession, the Academy qualified as a religious practice
protected by the first amendment. Numerous cases have held that a school regarded as
an integral part of a church's religious mission is a religious practice. See, e.g., Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1971); City of Concord v. New Testament Baptist
Church, 118 N.H. 56, 57-61, 382 A.2d 377, 378-80 (1978); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.
2d 181, 199-200, 351 N.E.2d 750, 761-62 (1976). The Academy was regarded as an inte-
gral part of the Church's mission. Brief of Appellants, supra note 16, at 23. "The tenets
of faith and beliefs of the members of the First Baptist Church require as a convictional
matter that their children receive an education which is biblical in its framework, philos-
ophy, and suppositional standards." Id. at 3-4. The First Baptist Church established the
Academy "to fulfill [the Church's] religious mission and the desires of the families in the
church to obey such scriptural passages as Proverbs 22:6 and Deuteronomy 6:7 to train
their children within a scriptural context." Brief of Appellants, supra note 16, at 4. The
congregants were "convinced that there were not suitable Christian schools of like prac-
tice and faith within a reasonable, workable area in which [to] ...enroll their children."
Id.
46. Merely alleging a burden on religious freedom does not give rise to strict scru-
tiny. Parties claiming the protection of the free exercise clause must prove that their
religious freedom has been burdened. See State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 200, 351
N.E.2d 750, 762 (1976); CoNsTrrrrIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 1054.
47. A de minimis burden on religious freedom will not support a free exercise claim.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 1054. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
218 (1972) (requiring a substantial burden to support a free exercise claim).
48. Whether a governmental action's ultimate effect upon religious conduct should
be attributed to the action for purposes of this balancing test involves a policy decision
about the extent to which government must accommodate religion. See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-4; infra notes 139-43. Because the first amendment restrains
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of the zoning ordinance and the building code on the Academy
*would be substantial if the laws' "practical effects" were to pro-
hibit the Church from operating the Academy. 9 The difficult
question for the court was whether the ultimate impact upon the
Academy of the generally applicable laws should be subject to
the limitations of the free exercise clause.
The court decided that the impact of applying the zoning
ordinance to forbid the Church from operating the Academy in
the Church's basement was subject to first amendment limita-
tions. The court also determined that the building code's
financially prohibitive impact upon the Academy burdened the
congregants' religious freedom.5 1 The court acknowledged that
both laws only indirectly and incidentally burdened the Acad-
emy, because compliance with the laws would not violate a fun-
damental tenet of the church members' faith.2 Yet, the court
attempted to draw analogies between the impact of the Sumner
laws upon the Academy and the burdens on religious freedom
that the Supreme Court addressed in Wisconsin v. Yoder" and
in Thomas v. Review Board." The analogies are not
convincing.5 6
In Yoder, the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin's compul-
sory attendance law violated the Amish's right to exercise their
religion freely." Although the Amish had no explicit religious
government from interfering with religious practices, the government's posture in caus-
ing the substantial effect upon religion is important for ascertaining if the government
has a duty to prevent the effect. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Doug-
las, J., concurring). See generally infra notes 109-43 and accompanying text. Cf. CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 497-523 (discussing the state action doctrine, under
which the effect of private conduct upon constitutionally protected rights may be attrib-
uted to a law, and thus subject the law to constitutional limitations).
49. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362
(1982).
50. See id. at 16-22, 639 P.2d at 1367-69 (Dolliver, J., dissenting); id. at 15-16, 639
P.2d at 1366-67 (Williams, J., concurring).
51. See id. at 4-8, 639 P.2d at 1361-63 (plurality opinion); id. at 14-15, 639 P.2d at
1366 (Utter, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 7, 639 P.2d at 1362 (plurality opinion). See id. at 20-21, 639 P.2d at 1369
(Dolliver, J., dissenting); infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
53. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
54. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
55. See 97 Wash. 2d at 19-21, 639 P.2d at 1368-69 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). The
court, id. at 7, 639 P.2d at 1362, cited three other cases in support of its decision: NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d
750 (1976); and State v. LaBarge, 134 Vt. 276, 357 A.2d 121 (1976). None of these cases
were analogous to First Baptist Church. See infra note 64.
56. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court stated that the Wisconsin law required the
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tenet prohibiting their children from attending public school
beyond the eighth grade,57 the law contravened the Amish's
basic religious tenets in two ways. First, the schooling exposed
Amish children to worldly attitudes, goals, and values contrary
to the Amish's sincere religious belief that they should "be not
conformed to this world. '58 Second, compulsory high school
attendance substantially interfered with the Amish children's
religious development and integration into their faith-commu-
nity's way of life.5 9 In Yoder, the Amish could not have complied
with the law without violating their religious tenets; the law nec-
essarily undermined their religious values.60
In Thomas v. Review Board,61 the Court held that Indiana's
unemployment compensation law, which conditioned significant
economic benefits upon conduct prohibited by Thomas' religious
beliefs, infringed upon Thomas' religious freedom. Thomas' reli-
gious beliefs forbade his involvement in producing military
weaponry. After the roll foundry where Thomas worked closed,
Thomas' employer transferred him to a department that pro-
duced tank turrets for the military. Upon learning that the com-
pany no longer had any departments that did not produce weap-
onry, Thomas quit his job. The State denied Thomas
unemployment compensation because he quit his job voluntarily
and not for "good cause. ' 62 The Indiana law violated Thomas'
religious freedom because the sole basis for denying Thomas
unemployment compensation was his religious stance. The con-
dition on unemployment benefits penalized Thomas for not vio-
lating his religious beliefs. 3
Amish to act in a manner inconsistent with their religious beliefs, under threat of crimi-
nal sanction. Id. at 218. Such a law creates a direct burden on religion. See text accom-
panying note 120.
57. 406 U.S. at 223.
58. Id. at 210-11, 216-17. The scriptural reference is to Romans 12:2. The Yoder
Court characterized this type of burden as "subjective." 406 U.S. at 218.
59. 406 U.S. at 211, 218. The Yoder Court characterized this kind of interference as
"objective." Id. at 218.
60. Id. at 218. See City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 20, 639
P.2d 1358, 1369 (1982) (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
61. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
62. Id. at 709-13.
63. Id. at 717-18. Thomas presented a situation similar to Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), discussed infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text, except that
Thomas' beliefs were not based upon a belief shared by all members of his religious sect.
450 U.S. at 711-17. Although the burden on Thomas' religion was indirect, the Court
required strict scrutiny because the Indiana law unconstitutionally conditioned the
receipt of unemployment benefits upon performance of religiously prohibited conduct.
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Thus, both in Yoder and in Thomas, the challenged law
forced the claimant to choose either yielding religious values to a
government-imposed standard or suffering a government-
imposed penalty." In contrast, neither establishing the Academy
in another location nor upgrading the Church's building so that
it complied with the code's school building standards would
have undermined the congregants' religious values.6 5 Neither the
zoning ordinance nor the building code penalized the Church for
operating the Academy. Rather, because the Church would be
inconvenienced by relocating the Academy and was financially
unable to comply with the building code," the court held that
the laws effectively closed the Church's school ministry.6 7 The
court's weak analogies to Yoder and Thomas did not explain
why the inconvenience and economic impact of the zoning ordi-
nance and the building code burdened the religious practice con-
450 U.S. at 717-18. See generally infra notes 135-36. But see Garvey, Freedom and
Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 193, 198-203 (arguing that neither
Sherbert nor Thomas involved a burden on religious freedom because both Thomas and
Sherbert could freely and voluntarily choose their courses of conduct).
64. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972). The
other cases the Washington Supreme Court cited in support of its decision involved laws
with similar undermining tendencies. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 499-
507 (1979) (because NLRB's restrictions on Church's teacher standards risked under-
mining the Catholics' goals for their religious education program, the Court construed
the National Labor Relations Act to avoid that constitutional issue); State v. Whisner, 47
Ohio St. 2d 181, 203-10, 351 N.E.2d 750, 764-67 (1976) (state regulations that controlled
nearly every minute of instruction time impeded the school's ability to incorporate reli-
gious instruction into classroom lessons); State v. LaBarge, 134 Vt. 276, 280-81, 357 A.2d
121, 124-25 (1976) (as the Washington Supreme Court understood LaBarge, Vermont's
regulation of private school teachers risked undermining the school's religious objectives.
However, the court misinterpreted LaBarge. LaBarge was decided on other grounds. See
134 Vt. at 277-81, 357 A.2d at 123-24.)
65. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 20-21, 639 P.2d at 1369 (Dolliver, J., dis-
senting). The congregants probably attached religious significance to conducting their
school in the Church's building, rather than at another location, especially in light of
their belief that the Academy was an integral part of their Church. See supra note 45. In
that event, denying the Academy a special use permit so that the zoning ordinance for-
bade operating the Academy in the Church's building might impose a burden on the
central tenets of the religious practice. See infra note 217.
However, the court did not base its decision on this ground. Although the court
directed the trial court on remand to examine the "practical effect" upon the congre-
gants' religious freedom of strictly enforcing the zoning ordinance and the building code,
97 Wash. 2d at 10, 639 P.2d at 1363, the court assumed that because the ordinances
precluded the Academy from operating in the Church's basement, the law burdened the
congregants' religion. See id. at 7-10, 639 P.2d at 1362-64.
66. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 4, 639 P.2d at 1360. See supra note 20.
67. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 7, 639 P.2d at 1362.
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ducted within the building. 8
The court's confusion is understandable. Although Supreme
Court decisions in cases involving the free exercise clause have
produced a balancing test,9 the Court never has clearly articu-
lated its test.7 0 In particular, the Court has not provided clear
principles for identifying the burdens upon religious freedom
that would trigger a strict scrutiny standard of review."1 Because
the Court's analytic approach to free exercise claims evolved
over many years, the Court's decisions do not easily yield those
principles.72 Nevertheless, certain principles have emerged for
identifying burdens on religious freedom. The Washington
Supreme Court misunderstood those principles in First Baptist
Church.
B. Identifying Burdens on Religious Freedom That Require
a Strict Scrutiny Standard of Review
The principles for identifying burdens on religious freedom
that require a strict scrutiny standard of review emerged from
decisions spanning more than a century. Commentators have
stated that the Court's treatment of church-state conflicts
evolved through three main stages.74 Reynolds v. United
68. See id. at 16, 20, 639 P.2d at 1367, 1369 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
69. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
70. See State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 890 (N.D. 1980). Compare United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-60 (1982) and Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)
(articulated general principles for applying the free exercise clause) with Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (clearly articulated a three-part test for applying
the establishment clause. But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4320 (1984) (the
establishment clause erects a variable barrier between church and state, and the Court is
unwilling to confine itself to any single test for claims under the establishment clause);
Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983) (warning that this three-part test is merely
a "helpful sign post") (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)). Thus,
although a test has emerged from the free exercise cases, the test has not been clearly
stated by the Court and does not provide substantial predictability.
71. Although the Court has stated that a law is invalid or is subject to strict scrutiny
if the law's "purpose or effect is to impede" religion, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
404 (1963) and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961), the Court has not expressly
indicated which effects it would recognize as impeding religion.
72. See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
73. The Court interpreted the free exercise clause for the first time in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). See infra note 92.
74. Note, Secular Control of Non-Public Schools, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 111, 112-13
(1980); Recent Development, Constitutional Law-Wisconsin v. Yoder (U.S. 1972), 18
VILL. L. Rav. 955, 956-57 (1973). See generally CONSTrrurONAL LAW, supra note 3, at
1053-59; Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966
Wis. L. REv. 217, 235-42; Comment, Zoning the Church: Toward a Concept of Reasona-
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States5 marked the first major stage in the Court's development
of free exercise clause doctrine, during which the Court adjudi-
cated free exercise claims with an absolutist, natural law
approach.76 Cantwell v. Connecticut77 signaled the Court's sec-
ond major stage of doctrinal development, replacing the former
absolutist approach with a balancing approach.78 The Court's
third major stage began with Sherbert v. Verner,79 where the
Court introduced the present strict scrutiny balancing test. 0
This evolutionary process generally followed doctrinal
developments in cases involving other first amendment rights,
particularly the right of free speech, 81 and occurred because of
the exigencies created by several changes in American society
and in its jurisprudence since the Court's decision in Reynolds.
Some of these changes included the growth of pluralism in the
United States;82 the expanded role of government regulation in
society;8 and the Court's decision to apply the free exercise
bleness, 12 CONN. L. REv. 571, 599 n.89 (1980).
The evolution of the Court's free exercise clause doctrine did not, of course, take
place in isolation, but rather reflected the Court's doctrinal developments in many other
areas of law. In particular, the free exercise cases have reflected the Court's various
approaches to cases involving other first amendment values. See infra note 81 and
accompanying text.
75. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
76. See infra note 85.
77. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
78. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
79. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
80. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 852.
81. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (free exercise claim),
utilizing the approaches of NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (claims of free-
dom of expression and of association), and American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (claims of freedom of speech and of association); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (decided under a combined free exercise and
free speech approach), utilizing the approach of Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S.
147, 160-62 (1939) (decided solely on free speech grounds, although religious interest was
present). See generally CoNsTrrrUrONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 1056-57 (free exercise
cases decided after Cantwell and before 1960 were decided on combined free speech-free
exercise grounds); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 852 n.35 (Sherbert employed in the
free exercise context the least restrictive alternative-compelling state interest analysis
that had been articulated in free speech cases).
The Court has developed many different approaches to analyzing first amendment
claims. See generally, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 908-16 (1963). The three-stage evolutionary process in free exercise
doctrine reflected points in this much more complex development of general first amend-
ment doctrine, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Note.
82. This growth in pluralism increased the scope of activities claiming protection as
religion. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
83. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720-21 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
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clause through the fourteenth amendment to the states." These
changes increased the occasions for litigating free exercise
claims. During this process the Court shifted from a relatively
absolute, natural law method of analysis85  to a balancing
approach.8 6 This balancing approach weighs the individual's
right to freely exercise his religion against societal interests that
conflict with the individual's religious practice.87 The balancing
approach recognizes a broader range of conflicts between govern-
ment and religion than the absolute approach, sometimes sub-
jecting a law's unintended effects to constitutional review.88
Although laws can affect religion in numerous ways, the
Court has limited application of its balancing test to conflicts
involving a close connection between a law and its effect on a
religious practice. This limitation is a policy decision as to gov-
ernment's duty to accommodate religion when enacting gener-
ally applicable laws.89 Regardless of the severity of the law's ulti-
mate impact on the religious practice, only laws that have this
close connection to the effect on the religious practice burden
ing); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 1-6, 14-1; Giannella, supra note 37, at 1383, 1387. See
generally C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 6-12 (1977). As both the
state and the federal governments' roles in society increased, new types of burdens on
religious freedom developed. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06, 409-10
(1963) (conditions on state government largess burdened religious freedom). Cf. Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972) (as the society around the Amish community
changed, conflicts increased between society and the Amish's religious practices). See
generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (increased government reg-
ulation has radically affected individual liberties by vesting in government significant
control over the means of exercising those liberties).
84. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
provides: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." In Cantwell, the Court held that the amendment's concept of
liberty protected from state interference included religious freedom. Cantwell at 303.
85. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-65 (1879). For discussions
of this early natural law theory, see generally E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACK-
GROUND OF AMEcCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955); E. PArrERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN
AND IDEAS OF THE LAW §§ 4.10-.18 (1953).
86. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. A balancing approach already
had been evolving, having been combined with natural law concepts in the Court's deci-
sions under the doctrine of substantive due process. When the Court withdrew from
deciding cases under a substantive due process rationale, natural law concepts were
retained in the Court's balancing approach to the protection of fundamental rights. See
generally 4 C. HAINES, HARVARD STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE: THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL
LAW CONCEPTs 166-85, 232-34 (1930); CONSTItrUTONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 452-59.
87. Balancing might be accomplished on an ad hoc basis or by a definitional
approach. See supra note 37.
88. See infra notes 108-43 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 108-12, 139-43 and accompanying text.
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religion in a manner that requires strict scrutiny.90 The Court's
adoption of this "proximity" requirement for identifying bur-
dens on religious freedom may be seen by reviewing the evolu-
tion of the Court's present balancing test.
The evolution of free exercise doctrine began in Reynolds v.
United States,91 where the Court first interpreted the free exer-
cise clause.9 2 In Reynolds, the Court articulated a distinction
between beliefs and actions 3 that still appears in many deci-
sions involving free exercise claims.94 This distinction related
both to the definition of the term "religion" in the first amend-
ment, and to the scope of the amendment's protection. With
respect to religious beliefs, religion was broadly and abstractly
defined.9 5 Congress could neither prescribe nor proscribe reli-
gious beliefs of any sort." With respect to religious actions, how-
ever, religion in the first amendment had a narrower meaning.
The meaning of religion in the first amendment, as that term
encompassed religious actions, was tied to tradition and to the
90. See infra notes 111-43 and accompanying text.
91. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
92. Reynolds was the Court's first clear construction of the free exercise clause. Pre-
viously the Court had rejected a free exercise claim on the ground that the free exercise
clause did not apply to the states. Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589,
609 (1845). The Court also had required that church property receive the same protec-
tion against state encroachments as was given to the property of non-religious corpora-
tions. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49-50 (1815). However, that decision was
not based on first amendment grounds. In Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727-
29 (1872), the Court held, in a pre-Erie decision, that under federal common law courts
must defer to the determinations of church governments in matters of church doctrine.
Similarly, in Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139-40 (1873), the Court held
that courts must defer to the determinations of the majority of the members of a congre-
gational church in matters of church doctrine.
93. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164, 166.
94. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2034-35 (1983);
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1978); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03
(1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721
F.2d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 1983); City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1,
14, 639 P.2d 1358, 1366 (1982) (Utter, J., concurring); State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d
735, 741, 612 P.2d 795, 798 (1980).
Given the expanded view of religion and the growth of government regulation, how-
ever, the distinction between beliefs and actions now is of little help in finding limits on
government restrictions on religion. See L. TamE, supra note 3, § 14-8, at 837-38. See
also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
95. The Court used the term "religion" to describe numerous unorthodox beliefs
and practices, including the practice of polygamy that led to Reynolds' bigamy convic-
tion. See 98 U.S. at 162, 166.
96. "[By the first amendment] Congress was deprived of all legislative power over
mere opinion [including religious beliefs] .... " 98 U.S. at 164.
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Court's perception of the framers' intent.9 7 Traditional (particu-
97. See L. TRm, supra note 3, § 14-6, at 826. The Reynolds Court said:
The word "religion" is not defined in the Constitution. We must go else-
where, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we
think, than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was
adopted. The precise point of the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom
which has been guarantied?
98 U.S. at 162.
After briefly rehearsing the history of the first amendment, the Court discussed
statements by Madison and Jefferson, and concluded that truly religious actions would
not be in violation of social duties or subversive of good order. 98 U.S. at 162-64. The
Court then looked to the social setting in which the first amendment was adopted, deter-
mined that polygamy was a violation of the social duties contemplated by the framers of
the amendment, and rejected Reynolds' constitutional claim. 98 U.S. at 164-66.
Twelve years later, the Court defined religion by distinguishing between "one's views
of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose, of reverence for his
being and character, and of obedience to his will," and the "form of worship of a particu-
lar sect." Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). The Court then said that "[i]t was
never intended or supposed that the [First] Amendment could be invoked as a protec-
tion against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and
morals of society." Id. Because Davis had registered to vote while belonging to the Mor-
mon Church, which at the time formally encouraged polygamy, the Court upheld Davis'
conviction of violating an Idaho law forbidding from voter registration anyone who
belonged to an organization that encouraged polygamy. The Court said:
To extend exemption from punishment for such crimes would be to shock the
moral judgment of the community.
Probably never before in the history of this country has it been seriously con-
tended that the-whole punitive power of the government, for acts recognized
by the general consent of the Christian world in modern times as proper mat-
ters for prohibitory legislation, must be suspended in order that the tenets of a
religious sect encouraging crime may be carried out without hindrance.
Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect
may designate as religion.
133 U.S. at 341-45.
During the same term the Court upheld a federal statute revoking the charter of the
Mormon Church and confiscating much of its property. Late Corporation of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). The law was
justified, the Court said, because by "the enlightened sentiment of mankind;" as found
in "the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in
the Western World," polygamy was merely a "pretense," not the practice of religion. Id.
at 49-50.
Thus, in the early cases involving the religion clauses of the first amendment, the
Court tied the meaning of the term "religion" to the perceived historical setting of the
amendment's adoption. Although religious beliefs could neither be prescribed nor pro-
scribed, the area within which the Court permitted acting in accordance with those
beliefs was circumscribed by traditional Christian standards. See generally 2 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrruriON OF mHa UNn'i STATES §§ 1874, 1877 (2d ed. 1851)
(observing the first amendment's underlying assumption that Christian principles would
guide social policy); 1 A. DE TocQuzvn.z, DEMocRAC IN AMERICA 314-18 (Bradley ed.
1945) (observing the prevailing influence of the Christian religion, particularly as the
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larly Christian) religious practices enjoyed complete protection
from federal criminal sanctions.9 These traditional practices cir-
cumscribed the boundaries of protected religious conduct.
Despite the Court's early deference to the framers' intent,
the Court's concept of religion changed as society changed."
America became increasingly pluralistic during the early
1900s.' *0 With the growth of government at both the state and
the federal levels and the decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut"'0
incorporating the free exercise clause into the fourteenth amend-
ment,"'2 the increasingly pluralistic society had greater opportu-
nity through litigation to redefine religion in the free exercise
clause.10 3
While retaining the distinction between beliefs and
actions,104 the Cantwell Court abandoned the ties to the fram-
ers' intent that were established in Reynolds.10 5 No longer was
framework for social morality, in the United States during the early 1830's).
98. See supra note 97.
99. See infra note 106.
100. See id. See generally S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 527
(1902). ("Only so far forth as the individual citizens shall be actuated by religious or
Christian motives can the government be religious or Christian. No mere form of words
put into the fundamental law can alter that condition, and no legal constraint can make
that Christian which is not such.")
101. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
102. Id. at 303. Even the incorporation of the free exercise clause into the four-
teenth amendment represented a shift away from reliance upon the framers' intent. See
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720-22 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Jafree v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1113-26 (D. Ala.), revod sub nom., Jaffree v.
Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
But see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-58 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (both religion clauses in the first amendment apply to the states to protect
religious liberty); Bird, Freedom from Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School
Instruction and Religious School Regulation, 2 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 129 n.17
(1979) (the free exercise clause applies to the states, but the establishment clause does
not so apply); Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L.
REV. 237 (1982) (the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended the Bill of Rights to
apply to the states).
103. Most Supreme Court decisions construing the free exercise clause have been
decided since the 1940 Cantwell decision. See generally R. MILLER & R. FLowERs,
TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 59-66 (1977)
(discussing Supreme Court free exercise decisions).
104. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text. Today many, if not most, com-
mentators state that the framers' intent is not particularly relevant to interpreting the
first amendment's religion clauses, either because of changed social conditions or because
of ambiguity about the framers' intent. See, e.g., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw, supra note 3, at
1029-30; L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 14-2, -3; Giannella, supra note 37, at 1382-84; Kur-
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religion in the free exercise clause different from religion in the
abstract.""6 Implicit in this expansion of the scope of protected
activity was the need for limiting principles. This need was com-
pounded by the increasingly pervasive role of government in
society.107 Thus, the Cantwell Court introduced a balancing test:
religious conduct of any sort was subject to regulation, but not
to undue infringement. 08 Whereas in Reynolds the free exercise
clause absolutely protected religious conduct that did not violate
land, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978-79); Marcus, supra note 37, at
1232-33. But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4319 (1984).
106. This change reflected the end of any semblance of consensus among the general
population about religion. According to Professor Tribe, "even before the ... [end of
the nineteenth] century, dramatic changes were surfacing in American religion ...
Religion in America, always pluralistic, has become radically so in the latter part of the
twentieth century." L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-6, at 826. See also Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240-41 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961). This increased pluralism "made it all but inevitable
that the Supreme Court would modify the narrow understanding of 'religion'...." L.
TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-6, at 827.
Professor Tribe marks Justice Douglas' opinion in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78 (1944), as beginning a particular shift in the meaning of religion in the free exercise
clause. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-6, at 829. In Ballard, the Court held that only the
adherent's sincerity could be scrutinized; the truth of a religious doctrine was beyond
judicial review. 322 U.S. at 86. Justice Douglas in Ballard substantially equated freedom
of religious beliefs with freedom of thought, thus broadening the concept of religion pro-
tected under the first amendment. Id. at 86-87. In later cases, religion had to be broad-
ened to include non-theistic ideologies. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-6, at 829-30.
Thus, by the early 1960's the Court had broken many ties with the past; the mean-
ing of religion in the first amendment now could be discovered by reference to the think-
ing of the contemporary pluralistic American society. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 180-85 (1965) and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461 (1961) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (religion in the Constitution is defined by social concepts of reli-
gion, however changing).
107. See supra note 83.
108. 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). See generally R. MILLER & R. FLowmts, supra
note 103, at 60-63. This balancing approach had previously been used in a similar case
decided on free speech and free press grounds. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S.
147, 160-62 (1939). In applying this new approach to free exercise claims, the Court gen-
eralized the Reynolds decision as articulating a belief/action distinction. Freedom to
believe was absolute, but "[c]onduct remain[ed] subject to regulation for the protection
of society." 310 U.S. at 303-04. However, the Court went on to say, "The freedom to act
must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every
case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end,
unduly to infringe the protected freedom." Id. at 304 (emphasis added). Yet, without the
underlying assumptions of what conduct was absolutely protected by the free exercise
clause, see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text, the Cantwell belief/action distinc-
tion offered little protection under the Court's new balancing test. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 3, § 14-8, at 838. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462-63 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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social duties as understood by the framers, 109 after Cantwell
nearly all religious conduct was subject to changing contempo-
rary social standards. 10
Cantwell marked the advent of the second major stage in
the Court's development of free exercise clause doctrine. After
Cantwel the Court, in identifying burdens on religious freedom
that give rise to this balancing test, had to define the extent of
government's duty to accommodate religion."' This duty to
accommodate religion has been imposed only when there is a
nexus between the challenged law and the religious practice of
the party claiming free exercise clause protection.'1 2
This nexus is a causation element describing the proximity
between a law's purpose and the law's ultimate effect on the
central tenets of the religion. 1 3 The degrees of proximity do not
fall neatly into categories, but the Court has identified at least
three kinds of burdens that serve as reference points for analyz-
ing the relationship between a law and its effect on religion. The
Court has distinguished between burdens that are "direct" 4
and those that are "indirect."' 15 Among those burdens that are
indirect, the Court has further distinguished between burdens
that operate upon the central tenets underlying a religious prac-
tice, and burdens that are merely "incidental," operating upon
109. See supra note 97. However, even the Reynolds Court was applying contempo-
rary social standards. See 98 U.S. at 165-67.
110. The Cantwell Court still relied upon tradition to establish social acceptability,
however. Thus, past societal standards continued to influence the Court. See 310 U.S. at
303-04.
111. Clearly not every consequence of government action that affects a religious
practice gives rise to a free exercise claim. In Braunfeld v. Brown, the Court said:
[W]e are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable
religious preference. . . . [I]t cannot be expected, much less required, that leg-
islators enact no law regulating conduct that may in some way result in an
economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to others because of the
special practices of the various religions. We do not believe that such an effect
is an absolute test for determining whether the legislation violates the freedom
of religion protected by the First Amendment.
366 U.S. 599, 606-07 (1961). Because the first amendment restricts the exercise of gov-
ernmental power, the limits of that restriction must be defined by reference to the man-
ner in which the power operates to restrict religion, not merely by assessing the magni-
tude of the law's ultimate effect on a religious practice. See infra notes 139-43 and
accompanying text. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412-13 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
112. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
113. See id.
114. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
115. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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the secular, peripheral aspects of a religious practice, but conse-
quentially affecting the central religious tenets1 6 The strict
scrutiny balancing test must be applied only when the burden
on religion is direct or, though indirect, operates upon the cen-
tral religious tenets; the strict scrutiny test has not been
required when the burden is merely incidental."
17
In Braunfeld v. Brown, s8 the Court attempted to articulate
this nexus requirement, indicating for the first time that direct
burdens should be distinguished from indirect burdens in deter-
mining the proper standard for reviewing the challenged law."'
A direct burden on religion was said to occur when a religious
practice is outlawed. 120 An indirect burden was less clearly
defined, but appeared to result from a law that had the effect of
making the practice of religion more difficult or more
expensive."12
In Braunfeld, Orthodox Jewish merchants challenged Penn-
116. See infra notes 118-39 and accompanying text. These three categories of bur-
dens on religion, "direct," "indirect but not incidental," and "incidental," resemble the
three categories of governmental benefits to religion that have been identified in estab-
lishment clause cases. Under that classification scheme, government aid to religion is
impermissible if it flows from a law that purposefully aids religion or has the effect of
aiding religion, unless that effect is merely remote and incidental. See Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4321 (1984); L. Taa, supra note 3, §§ 14-8, -9. Professor Tribe
would employ the establishment clause classification scheme in analyzing free exercise
claims. See id., §§ 14-8, -9.
117. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text. But cf. Jewish Reconstruction-
ist Synagogue v. Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 287-91, 342 N.E.2d 534, 538-40
(1975) (invalidating zoning ordinance on free exercise grounds where Church could not
afford to comply with setback requirements and where ordinance would limit the loca-
tion of the Church, although the court did not clearly employ a strict scrutiny standard
of review), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
118. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
119. Id. at 605-07.
120. Id. at 606. See State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 889 (N.D. 1980); Marcus,
supra note 37, at 1238. A law may directly burden religious freedom by prohibiting
affirmative religious conduct, as in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upheld
bigamy conviction of Mormon whose religion required practice of polygamy). A law also
may directly burden religious freedom by compelling conduct repugnant to a religious
adherent's beliefs. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (compulsory flag salute, which to Jehovah's Witnesses was forbidden idolatry, vio-
lated the Jehovah's Witnesses' religious liberty). In these circumstances, the connection
between the exercise of governmental power and its effect on religion is clear.
121. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606. Indirect burdens typically have involved the
economic effects of legislation upon religion. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605-06. However, economic impact per se has not been
sufficient to establish a burden on religious freedom. See infra notes 139-43 and accom-
panying text.
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sylvania's Sunday closing law.122 The merchants complained that
because their religion's Sabbath-observance required them to
close their shops on Saturday, the Sunday closing laws disadvan-
taged the Jewish merchants, compared with their Christian com-
petitors whose Sabbath coincided with the required Sunday
closing. 123 Although the Court recognized that the laws had a
substantial adverse economic effect upon the Jewish merchants,
the Court denied the merchants relief.12 4 The burden on the
Sabbatarians' religious freedom was "only indirect," and did not
require strict scrutiny.125
In Braunfeld, the Court appeared to hold that indirect bur-
dens categorically required less scrutiny than direct burdens; if a
law adversely affected a religious practice without subjecting the
practitioner to criminal sanctions, the law was valid unless it
had an invalid purpose or effect, was overly broad, or invidiously
discriminated among religious practitioners. 26 But two years
later, in Sherbert v. Verner,27 the Court clarified its test by fur-
ther distinguishing among indirect burdens. 128
The Sherbert Court made clear that merely characterizing a
122. 366 U.S. at 600. Braunfeld was one of four companion cases involving chal-
lenges to state Sunday closing laws. The three other cases were: McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Maryland Sunday closing law); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (Pennsylvania Sunday closing law); and Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (Massachusetts Sunday closing law).
The cases involved various claims, including claims under the free exercise clause, the
establishment clause, the due process clause, and the equal protection clause. In each
case the law was upheld.
123. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601-02.
124. Id. at 603-09. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 520-22 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (opinion applying to Braunfeld).
125. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605-06. However, the Braunfeld Court's analysis went
beyond a mere rationality review. See infra note 184.
126. Id. at 606-09. The Court generally has used the "purpose or effect" analysis in
cases involving the establishment clause. See generally CONSTrruTiONAL LAW, supra note
3, at 1030-31; L. Taar, supra note 3, §§ 14-8, -9.
127. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
128. The Court entered the third major stage of free exercise doctrinal development
in Sherbert. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
Justice Stewart argued that Sherbert effectively overruled Braunfeld. 374 U.S. at
417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring in result). Many, if not most, commentators agree with
Justice Stewart that Braunfeld should not survive the Sherbert decision. See, e.g., L.
TRME, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 854-55; Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty
and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH. L. REv. 269, 274-76, 287-88 (1968); Marcus, supra
note 37, at 1225. However, these commentators also recognize that Sherbert did not
overrule Braunfeld. L. TREBE, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 854-55; Kauper, supra, at 274-76,
287-88; Marcus, supra note 37, at 1239. See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at
1058.
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burden either as direct or as indirect would not determine the
proper standard of review.129 While direct burdens on religion
still were subject to strict scrutiny, the Court also required strict
scrutiny for certain types of indirect burdens.130 The Court did
not, however, overrule Braunfeld."1 The Sherbert Court refined
the Braunfeld direct/indirect distinction by holding that the
state has a duty to administer its laws so as not to penalize or
discourage the exercise of religion, even when the laws only indi-
rectly affect religious practices.1 32 But the Sherbert Court did
not require strict scrutiny whenever a law merely impacts a reli-
gious practice.
In Sherbert, the Court applied strict scrutiny in reviewing
the challenged application of the South Carolina Unemployment
Act. 33 Adell Sherbert had been denied unemployment benefits
solely because her religious beliefs were inconsistent with the
Act's Saturday work availability requirement.1 3 4 In other con-
texts the conditioning of welfare benefits upon forfeiture of con-
stitutional rights had been recognized as an unconstitutional
129. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04.
130. Id. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
131. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-09. See supra note 128. The majority opinion in
Sherbert was written by Justice Brennan, whose dissent in Braunfeld focused upon the
impact on religion resulting from the Sunday closing law. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 613
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). In Sherbert, Justice Brennan attempted to dis-
tinguish Sherbert from Braunfeld by reference to a balancing test, listing differences in
the burdens on the respective religious interests, in the substance of the respective state
interests, and in the alternative means available to accomplish each interest. See Sher-
bert, 374 U.S. at 408-09. Justice Brennan observed in Sherbert that the economic impact
on the Sabbatarians in Braunfeld was a "less direct burden" than the burden involved in
Sherbert, and also distinguished Braunfeld on the basis that the "strong" state interest
in the Sunday closing laws, which could be accomplished by no less restrictive means
than were used in Braunfeld, was "wholly dissimilar" to South Carolina's interests in
disqualifying Sherbert from unemployment benefits. Id. at 408-09. Justice Brennan
restated Braunfeld as requiring only a strong state interest, rather than the compelling
one required in Sherbert. Id. at 408. Justice Stewart, whose dissent in Braunfeld, 366
U.S. at 616, focused upon economic impact per se for determining a burden on religion,
was unconvinced by Justice Brennan's distinction in Sherbert because he continued to
focus upon the impact on religious practices rather than upon the manner in which the
impact occurred. See 374 U.S. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
132. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404-06.
133. Id. at 399, 404-06.
134. "Appellant . . . was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she
would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith." Id. at 399. Her refusal to
work on Saturday was deemed by South Carolina to be without "good cause," which
under the State's unemployment compensation law rendered her ineligible for benefits.
Id. at 400-01. "Here ... appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from
the practice of her religion. . . ." Id. at 404.
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exercise of power, penalizing the exercise of those rights.,1 5
Because Sherbert's religious practice was the basis for denying
her benefits to which she otherwise was entitled, the Court
viewed the denial as a penalty, equivalent to a prior restraint on
Sherbert's Sabbath observance."'6 The Sherbert Court strictly
scrutinized the denial under a "compelling state interest" test,87
even though the burden on religion was only indirect. 38
The Braunfeld/Sherbert dichotomy shows that the Court
has distinguished indirect burdens by examining the relation-
ship between the core, or sine qua non, of the religious practice
and the governmental conduct causing the burden. The Sherbert
Court did not extend strict scrutiny protection to all instances
where a law ultimately results in inconvenience or economic
hardship to a religious practice;3 9 rather, the Court extended
135. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 528-30, 546-51; O'Neil,
Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. Rv.
443 (1966); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
144, 152 (1968). See also sources cited in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 405 n.6.
136. The [ineligibility] ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and aban-
doning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for
her Saturday worship.
[T]o condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to
violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free
exercise of her constitutional liberties.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404-06. The penalty exacted by the law for the privilege of exercis-
ing the constitutional right to practice religion was the forfeiture of an interest in the
unemployment benefits. See id. at 410. Thus, the Court was viewing the kind of burden
in Sherbert as equivalent to a prior restraint, such as the license taxes imposed upon
colportage in Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) and Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
137. 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). It
appears that the Court's first use of a compelling state interest element in a first amend-
ment balancing test was in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463
(1958).
138. 374 U.S. at 404-05. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 851-52
(discussing the existence of the pervasive affirmative state as the reason the economic
effect in Sherbert was treated as an infringement on religious liberty).
Thus, the expansion of free exercise clause protections in Sherbert stemmed from
two earlier developments. First, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and the
emergence of the pervasive, affirmative state, changing the concept of "property,"
brought the unemployment compensation law in Sherbert within the reach of the prior
restraint precedents. Second, the evolving strict scrutiny test for infringements of first
amendment freedoms added the compelling state interest requirement to the free exer-
cise clause balancing test.
139. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409-10.
632 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 7:607
such protection only to cases in which the law has a close nexus
to the core of the religious practice. 1 0 In such cases, the core of
the religious practice usually is an operative element in applying
the law,' and the Court will, as a policy matter, recognize the
law's effect as within the reach of the free exercise clause. 142 In
140. Recognizing the effect of a law as a burden on religion implies some sort of
limiting factor. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (the freedom to
practice religion must have appropriate limitations to preserve the state's power to regu-
late for the protection of society). One such factor is the substantiality of the burden.
See supra note 47. A second factor is a matter of policy, involving considerations analo-
gous to those underlying the tort concept of proximate or legal causation, that is based
upon a decision as to the increasingly pervasive state's duty to insulate religion from the
effects of generally applicable laws. Cf. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §
42, at 244-45; § 43, at 254-58 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing tort concept of proximate cause).
Borrowing the tort concept of legal causation is useful for articulating a limiting factor,
as courts and commentators have demonstrated by using the concept in numerous other
applications. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 177 (2d ed. 1972) (discussing the use of the legal causation doctrine in determining the
degree of attenuation in the relationship between cause and effect that is required to
remove the taint from evidence obtained through unlawful police conduct); L. TRIBE,
supra note 3, § 3-22 (discussing a prudential limitation on standing to assert a claim in
federal court that is similar to the tort legal causation doctrine). Cf. id. § 18-7 (discussing
the presence of the pervasive, positive state as a factor in state action analysis). Legal
causation also is used in criminal law as a factor to limit responsibility for the ultimate
consequences of an act. See W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 35
(1972).
141. In Sherbert, a burden on religion occurred when unemployment benefits were
denied because Sherbert observed the Sabbath of her faith. "[N]o State may 'exclude
individual . ..members of any ... faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.'" 374 U.S. at 410 (emphasis in origi-
nal) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)). See also 374 U.S. at 412
(Douglas, J., concurring). ("This case is resolvable ...solely in terms of what govern-
ment may not do to an individual in violation of his religious scruples.") In Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 709-18 (1981), Thomas' religious freedom was burdened when
he was denied unemployment benefits because his religiously based conscientious objec-
tion to manufacturing weapons was deemed not to be a "good cause" for voluntarily
terminating employment. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
142. The Court carefully limited Sherbert's recognition of a burden on religious
freedom to cases where unconstitutional conditions were placed upon the exercise of reli-
gion. 374 U.S. at 404-05, 409-10. Whether other indirect burdens on religion will give rise
to a claim under the free exercise clause depends upon a court's perception of the state's
duty to accommodate religious practices in its general regulatory schemes. The Court
and some commentators have described this duty in terms of avoiding governmental
coercion against religion. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)
(coercive impact of an unconstitutional condition was a burden on religion); Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 404 n.5 (coercive effect on exercise of first amendment rights burdens those
rights); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (dictum, in case
decided on the same day as Sherbert, stating that the free exercise clause is predicated
on coercion); CONS'TTUONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 1054. The precise meaning of the
term "coercion" as used by the Court is unclear. It appears that when indirect burdens
are involved, the term is used to describe instances where the state exacts a price for the
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cases such as Braunfeld, where the effect on a religious practice
is more remotely related to the law's objective and the law only
incidentally impacts religion by burdening a secular aspect of
the religious conduct, the law's ultimate impact on the religious
practice is not a burden on religion requiring strict scrutiny. 43
Although this distinction between laws that effectively
penalize protected activities and laws that only incidentally
affect such activity has been articulated in free speech cases,'44
right to engage in a religious practice, but not to instances where the religious practition-
ers are required to bear the costs usually associated with an activity. See Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring). See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-20; Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 403-06, 409-10; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943). Cf. Minneap-
olis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1369-76
(1983) (discriminatory ink and paper tax violated the first amendment's protection of
the press, although a generally applicable tax would not). Mere adverse impact does not
amount to coercion. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306-08 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983). See supra
note 111. But see CONsTrrUTIONAL LAw, supra note 3, at 1054. ("[A]ny regulation which
substantially impairs the practice of a religion will be sufficiently 'coercive' to merit fur-
ther review under the balancing test.") The authors of this treatise are unclear as to
when a regulation's effects "impair" a religious practice. It is doubtful that they intended
that mere impact should suffice.
Another way of stating this coercion requirement is in terms of the centrality to the
religion of the interest affected by the regulation. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, Inc., 699 F.2d at 306-07. This articulation defines coercion by reference
to individual rights rather than by reference to the nature of the government action and
presumes a close connection between the law and the interest affected. Similarly, the
distinction between religious beliefs and religious actions, see supra text accompanying
notes 93-94, may be used to describe a law's coercive impact upon religion by describing
the proximity between the law and its impact upon religious beliefs. See, e.g., Abram v.
City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, -, 661 S.W.2d 371, 372-73 (1983).
143. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-09 (1961); Lakewood, Ohio Congre-
gation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306-08 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983); Pinski v. Village of Norridge, 561 F. Supp. 605, 607
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1299-1301 (Alaska
1982). Cf. L. TamE, supra note 3, §§ 12-2, -20. (Under Professor Tribe's "two track"
classification scheme for ways in which government may abridge free speech, the inciden-
tel impact on speech of a generally applicable law, aimed only at noncommunicative
aspects of the speech, is a "track-two inhibition," which generally does not require strict
scrutiny review.)
144. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68-69 n.7 (1981). In
this Note, citations to Schad and to Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976), are not intended to suggest that religious activities are on the same footing as so-
called adult theaters and bookstores. In addition to the different treatment given to such
establishments because they involve commercial activity, compared with the treatment
of non-commercial speech activity, religion has an important historical and traditional
role in society that should be taken into account in assessing whether the activity "is
basically incompatible" with other activities in a zoning district. See Schad, 452 U.S. at
75. Purveying literature and entertainment to appeal to prurient interests often has
attendant harms that render that activity basically incompatible with other activities in
a zoning district, see Young, 427 U.S. at 63-73, while many religious activities are not
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the distinction generally has not been articulated in free exercise
cases.145 The Washington Supreme Court missed the distinction,
taking out of context a statement in Sherbert that "any inciden-
tal burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be
justified [only] by a 'compelling state interest' .. .146 The
court concluded that "[t]he fundamental tenet involved need
not be directly impacted for the regulation to be constitutionally
infirm.' 47 Sherbert does not support the supreme court's con-
clusion. In Sherbert, the Court held that a law may be constitu-
tionally infirm even though the law does not directly burden a
practice by prohibiting it, but the Court still required a direct
impact upon a fundamental tenet of the religion. 48 The Wash-
repugnant to the neighborhood atmosphere. See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 377, § 2
(1960). Nevertheless, because both activities are protected by the first amendment, the
applications of first amendment protections to both activities share analytic similarities.
145. But see Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306-08 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983); State v.
Cameron, 184 N.J. Super. 66, 79-81, 445 A.2d 75, 82-83 (1982), aff'd, 189 N.J. Super. 404,
460 A.2d 191 (1983); Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App.
1065, 1072-73, 610 P.2d 273, 277 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
146. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) quoted in City of Sumner v. First
Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7-8, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362 (1982).
147. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 8, 639 P.2d at 1362. Sherbert does not
support this focus on mere impact. Justice Hicks quoted Sherbert as requiring strict
scrutiny for "any incidental burden on the free exercise of. . . religion." 97 Wash. 2d at
7-8, 639 P.2d at 1362 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403). However, the context of that
language is significant. The Sherbert Court contrasted an "incidental burden" with
direct burdens on religion and with "no infringement" on religious freedom. 374 U.S. at
403. Following that discussion, the Sherbert Court inquired whether the unemployment
insurance disqualification imposed "any burden" on Sherbert's religious freedom. Id. To
answer that question, the Court turned to the nature of the regulation involved. The
Court noted that the pressure upon Sherbert to forsake her religious practices was an
indirect result of the law, because the law imposed no criminal sanctions for not working
on Saturday. "But this is only the beginning ... of our inquiry.... (Under some cir-
cumstances, a] law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be character-
ized as being only indirect." 374 U.S. at 403-04 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 607 (1961)). The Court then went on to describe the nature of the governmental
conduct that put "the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a
fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. See
also id. at nn.5-6.
Thus, the Sherbert Court did not look just at the degree of the law's impact, but
also looked at the manner in which the power exerted by the government affected the
central tenets underlying Sherbert's religious practice. Contrary to the Washington
Supreme Court's assertion, Sherbert did require that a fundamental tenet underlying the
religious practice be directly affected by the law, even though no direct burden was
required. Although the Sherbert Court used the term "incidental" in its analysis, 374
U.S. at 403, the Court's opinion did not hold that mere impact resulting from the regula-
tion of peripheral aspects of religious conduct will support a free exercise claim.
148. See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text, and supra note 147.
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ington Supreme Court's conclusion that a direct impact on a
fundamental tenet of the Church "has never been a require-
ment"14 9 is a non sequitur, belying the cases cited as support.150
Because the Washington Supreme Court identified the zon-
ing restriction and the building code's economic burden upon
the Academy as incidental burdens on religious freedom," 1 and
because the court believed that any substantial incidental bur-
den on the exercise of religion was subject to strict scrutiny, 15 2
the supreme court held that the trial court erred in not review-
ing the Sumner laws under that strict scrutiny standard. 53 How-
ever, those incidental effects on the Academy did not infringe
upon the congregants' free exercise of religion. 5 4 The laws
merely regulated secular aspects of the school operation.
Although the ordinances significantly affected the Church's
operation of the Academy, the laws did not penalize the Church
for operating its parochial school. Thus, the court should not
have required the trial court to use the Sherbert strict scrutiny
standard of review. 55
149. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 7, 639 P.2d at 1362.
150. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
151. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 7-8, 639 P.2d at 1362.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 8-10, 639 P.2d at 1362-64.
154. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. Accord, Grosz v. City of Miami
Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 735-40 (11th Cir. 1983); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 72 (1983); Pinski v. Village of Norridge, 561 F. Supp. 605, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1299-1301 (Alaska 1982); Abram
v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, -, 661 S.W.2d 371, 372-73 (1983); Hough v. North
Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 783-84, 312 N.W.2d 158, 159-60 (1981) (per
curiam); Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 1072-73,
610 P.2d 273, 277 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981); Antrim Faith Baptist
Church v. Commonwealth, - Pa. Commw. -, -, 460 A.2d 1228, 1230-31 (1983). See
also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (dictum) (building and zoning regula-
tions are necessary and are permissible church-state contacts).
155. See Hough v. North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 783-84, 312
N.W.2d 158, 159-60 (1981) (per curiam); Antrim Faith Baptist Church v. Common-
wealth, - Pa. Commw. -, -, 460 A.2d 1228, 1230-31 (1983). (Both courts rejected
free exercise claims and upheld building codes under facts very similar to those in First
Baptist Church.) Numerous cases have rejected free exercise claims and upheld zoning
ordinances under facts similar to those in First Baptist Church. See, e.g., Grosz v. City
of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 735-40 (11th Cir. 1983); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1299-
1301 (Alaska 1982); Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, -, 661 S.W.2d 371, 372-
73 (1983); State v. Cameron, 184 N.J. Super. 66, 79-81, 445 A.2d 75, 82-83 (1982) aff'd,
189 N.J. Super. 404, 460 A.2d 191 (1983); Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas
County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 1072-73, 610 P.2d 273, 277 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S.
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V. THE EFFECT OF THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION
Because the Washington Supreme Court remanded the case
to the trial court for the prescribed balancing of interests, 15 the
court did not address the practical difficulties that would result
from its decision. One foreseeable consequence of the court's
decision on the zoning issue is that a Washington city generally
will not be able to exclude parochial schools from a residential
district, at least when the sponsoring church is permitted in the
district.15 7 A broad reading of the decision suggests that strict
902 (1981). Of course, the Washington Supreme Court might have construed the Wash-
ington Constitution to require strict scrutiny in First Baptist Church. See generally
Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions
and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 491 (1984). In
addition to the Church's federal first amendment claim, the Church had claimed the
protection of the Washington Constitution. See First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 4,
639 P.2d at 1361 (plurality opinion); id. at 14, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J., concurring).
WASH. CONST. amend. XXXIV, amending WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11, provides:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and
worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested
or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licen-
tiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the
state.
If the First Baptist Church plurality opinion had contained "an explicit statement that
the decision [was] 'alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
[state] grounds,' "then the opinion would rest upon an interpretation of the state consti-
tution sufficiently clear to avoid Supreme Court review of the court's construction of the
federal constitution. Utter, supra, at 505-06 (alteration in original) (quoting Michigan v.
Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983)). However, the plurality did not indicate that its deci-
sion rested upon the Washington Constitution. Thus, First Baptist Church's authority
and precedential value as an interpretation of the Washington Constitution is doubtful.
156. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 10, 639 P.2d at 1363-64. After the case
was remanded, the trial court did not apply the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny test
because the parties settled their dispute by stipulated judgment. Stipulation For and
Order of Dismissal, City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d
1358 (1982).
157. 2 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 126 (4th ed. Supp. 1983).
See First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 19, 639 P.2d at 1368 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
Shortly after the First Baptist Church decision, the Washington Supreme Court
remanded another parochial school zoning case for reconsideration in light of First Bap-
tist Church. Peace Assembly Church v. City of Tacoma, No. 301828, letter op. at 3
(Pierce County, Wash. Super. Ct., Aug. 9, 1982). Peace Assembly Church's parochial
school, serving forty-nine students, violated the zoning ordinance of the city of Tacoma,
Washington. Before First Baptist Church was decided, the city had sought an injunction
to close the school. The trial court granted the injunction on the city's motion for sum-
mary judgment. Id. at 1-3. When the case was remanded after the First Baptist Church
decision, the trial court applied strict scrutiny in an ad hoc manner and invalidated the
zoning ordinance as applied to the parochial school. Id. at 7-8.
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scrutiny is required whenever a city bars a religious property use
from a residential district, 8  and that strict scrutiny review may
be required for zoning restrictions on other activities protected
by the first amendment. e59 The decision's effect may be to
require strict scrutiny of zoning laws whenever they substan-
tially affect a protected activity, a result that nullifies a city's
power to regulate the time, place, and manner of first amend-
ment activities. 60 This places a limitation on a city's zoning
power that the Supreme Court has refused to ascribe to theConstitution."'
The court's decision recognizing the building code's eco-
nomic burden as an infringement upon the free exercise of reli-
gion is even more problematic. First, if a trial court must deter-
mine whether a regulation imposes actual financial hardship
upon a church, 62 making such a determination may impermissi-
bly entangle government in the church's religious affairs.' 5 Par-
158. Because the court did not base its decision upon any violation of a religious
tenet that might have resulted from the zoning restriction, there is no reason to treat a
parochial school any differently than any other religious use with respect to the proper
standard of review to be applied to a zoning restriction.
159. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. Under this reasoning, buildings
housing protected speech, press, and assembly activities could claim protection from
building codes and zoning ordinances under the First Baptist Church decision.
160. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
161. See Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1300-01 (Alaska
1982). See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upheld zon-
ing ordinance that dispersed "adult" theaters, limiting the theaters' locations without
banning them from the city). Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or.
App. 1065, 1072-73, 610 P.2d 273, 277 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981). See
also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (dictum).
162. The plurality stated that the First Baptist Church could not afford to comply
with the building code. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 4, 7, 639 P.2d at 1360,
1362. However, this statement must be read in light of the instruction to the trial court
to "consider the practical effect uncompromising enforcement of the City's building code
and zoning ordinance will have on appellants' First Amendment rights." Id. at 10, 639
P.2d at 1363 (plurality opinion). See also id. at 15, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J., concur-
ring). Thus, although the court treated the burden as established, it did not determine
that the Church had established actual financial hardship. The court left this determina-
tion for the trial court.
163. See Serritella, Tangling with Entanglement: Toward a Constitutional Evalua-
tion of Church-State Contacts, 44 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROaS. 143, 143-46, 154 (1981).
This entanglement between government and a church may violate both the establish-
ment clause and the free exercise clause. See id. at 154.
It is not clear how a trial court would determine actual financial hardship to the
organization. Because the supreme court instructed the trial court to make this determi-
nation, the higher court might have believed that the affidavit of the Academy's princi-
pal, see supra note 20, stating that the Church could not afford to make the building
improvements, was insufficient. As with any witness, the statements and testimony of
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ticularly when a religious organization has a multi-faceted minis-
try, such a determination might involve a court or an
administrative agency in scrutinizing the organization's expendi-
tures and passing judgment upon the propriety of the organiza-
tion's resource allocation.'" This entanglement of government
with religion may violate both the establishment clause and the
free exercise clause.
165
Second, if a court granted a church an exemption because
the church was financially unable to comply with a regulation,'"
presumably the exemption would expire if the church became
financially able to comply. 67 This approach would imply ongo-
ing policing by the court or administrative agency, causing
administrative hardship and further compounding the risk of
impermissible church-state entanglement.168
To avoid this entanglement, the court or agency would have
to defer to the religious organization's determination that it was
unable to bear the regulation's financial burden.' 69 Thus, almost
every generally applicable law with substantial economic conse-
quences would be subject to strict scrutiny review if, even in
good faith, a religious organization in its resource allocation
placed a low priority on complying with a particular law's
members of religious organizations should be respected. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 618 (1971). At the same time, however, rules of evidence foreclose a court from
considering religious beliefs in assessing the credibility of a witness, including those of a
witness testifying about a religious organization's ability to bear an expense. See FED. R.
EvID. 610; WASH. R. EVID. 610. The Washington Constitution also prohibits questioning a
witness in a state court concerning "his religious belief to affect the weight of his testi-
mony." WASH. CONST. amend. XXXIV, amending WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
164. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970); id. at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring).
165. See Serritella, supra note 163, at 154. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof....
166. See supra note 162-63.
167. Alternatively, the knowledge that if financial resources become available they
must be used to comply with requirements that a church considers unnecessary or of low
priority could influence the church's financial planning and resource allocation. Cf. Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 692 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
168. Administrative hardship usually is not, by itself, a determinative factor. See
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 853.
But see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982). More important is the extent
and duration of the state's contacts with the church that would result from this ongoing
policing arrangement. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
169. Cf. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976)
(courts must defer to Church's determinations in matters of church doctrine and govern-
ment); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944) (courts may only inquire into
whether a religious belief is sincerely held, and may not assess the verity of the belief).
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requirements. The opportunity for unnecessary church-state
conflicts would increase-conflicts that should be minimized
whenever possible. 17 0
A third consequence of the strict scrutiny standard imposed
by the supreme court is the loss of the objective decision-making
criteria contained in generally applicable laws such as the Sum-
ner building code. Although such laws often are applied with
varying rigidity, 7 1 they nevertheless provide substantial objec-
tivity and certainty.1' By contrast, under the least restrictive
means tier of the strict scrutiny balancing test,'"7 general stan-
dards are substituted for objective rules.17 4 In the case of a
building code, quantifiable, articulated, and generally applicable
rules are replaced by a vague standard: "make it safe."
Safety is a relative concept.17 5 Although an official adminis-
tering the code generally could not impose stricter safety
requirements than those specified in the building code, 76 mak-
ing an individualized determination increases the risk of dis-
criminatory enforcement and magnifies the extent and the dura-
tion of contacts between government and the religious
organization. 7 The resulting entanglement of government with
170. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970); Serritella, supra note
163, at 157-58.
171. See C. FIELD & S. RIVKIN, THE BUILDING CODE BURDEN 35 (1975); THE REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUSING 217-18 (1982). Cf. Ackerman, Regulating Slum
Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and
Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1095 (1971).
172. The very existence of a building code establishes rules that serve as reference
points for evaluating the code standards as applied. The code provisions may not be
optimal, see infra notes 211-12, but the requirements were formulated by experts in a
detached setting, thereby serving as a check on the kind of broad administrative discre-
tion that may be constitutionally impermissible. See infra note 205 and accompanying
text. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657-58 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See generally Giannella, supra note 37, at 1381; Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959).
173. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
174. However, even under the strict scrutiny balancing test required by the court,
the trial court still may have decided that the complications involved in making particu-
larized determinations in applying the building code would justify denying the Church's
claim. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1982). See also supra note 39.
175. See S. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS & GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS: CONFRONTING THE
REGULATORY MAZE 71, 94, 306 (1978).
176. The Sumner building code provides minimum standards. BUILDING CODE,
supra note 2, § 102. In some unusual instances, standards stricter than those in the code
might be required. See id. § 203.
177. See Serritella, supra note 163, at 157-58. Cf. A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
49-50 (1980) (chief danger to freedom of expression by minority groups lies in ordinances
giving to local authorities wide discretion in the ordinances' enforcement). As a practical
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religion has the potential for more harassing and oppressive con-
tacts than the systematic, periodic inspections required by the
building code. 178 Although the supreme court's objective of pro-
tecting religious freedom is commendable, by requiring strict
scrutiny in First Baptist Church, the court in fact opened the
way for governmental intrusion into the affairs of religious
organizations.
VI. A RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The court should have reviewed Sumner's zoning ordinance
and building code under the intermediate scrutiny standards
179
applicable to statutes that regulate the time, place, and manner
of exercising first amendment rights.180 Such a regulation is valid
matter, a building inspector often is not qualified to make an independent assessment of
a building's safety; his inspection must rely upon standards prescribed by experts. See
Hough v. North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 785, 312 N.W.2d 158, 160
(1981) (per curiam).
178. See Serritella, supra note 163, at 157-58.
179. "Intermediate scrutiny" is used here to denote a standard of review that is less
stringent than "strict scrutiny," but less deferential than "minimum scrutiny." Cf. L.
TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 16-30, -31 (discussing intermediate scrutiny standard in equal
protection doctrine). This approach is more ad hoc than the strict scrutiny test, see
supra note 37, but rather than balancing the value of a religious practice against the
importance of the state interest, only the degree of infringement, determined by the
manner in which the law affects religion, is balanced against the state interest. See Grosz
v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 735-40 (11th Cir. 1983).
180. See Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739-41; Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d
1293, 1300 (Alaska 1982); State v. Cameron, 184 N.J. Super. 66, 79-81, 445 A.2d 75, 82-83
(1982), afl'd, 189 N.J. Super. 404, 460 A.2d 191 (1983); Damascus Community Church v.
Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 1072-73, 610 P.2d 273, 277 (1980), appeal dis-
missed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981). See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68-
77 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976); id. at 78-80
(Powell, J., concurring); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405-08 (1953). See gen-
erally CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 977, 984-88.
Courts have adopted numerous approaches to resolving disputes involving regulation
of religious property uses. A discussion of these approaches is beyond the scope of this
Note. Sources discussing the regulation of religious property uses include the following: 2
R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 12.18-.27 (2d ed. 1976); J. CURRY, PUBLIC
REGULATION OF THE RELIGIOUS USE OF LAND (1964); 7 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNIC-
IPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 24.519, .520 (3d ed. 1981 rev. vol.); 8 Id. §§ 25.131f, .131g (3d ed.
1976 rev. vol.); 2 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 20 (4th ed. 1983); 1
P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 3.05[4] (1983); 3 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN
PLANNING LAW ch. 77 (1975); 6 E. YOKLEv, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 35-14, -62 (4th
ed. 1980); Walker, What Constitutes a Religious Use for Zoning Purposes, 27 CATH.
LAW. 129 (1982); Comment, Zoning the Church: Toward a Concept of Reasonableness,
12 CONN. L. REV. 571 (1980); Comment, Zoning Ordinances, Private Religious Conduct,
and the Free Exercise of Religion, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 786 (1981); Annot., 11 A.L.R.4th
1084 (1982); Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 14 (1976); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 197 (1975); Annot., 74
A.L.R.2d 377 (1960).
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if it is content-neutral,' 8 ' significantly furthers a substantial and
legitimate governmental interest, is narrowly drawn and is not
subject to arbitrary application, and does not absolutely prevent
the exercise of first amendment rights.18 2
Although this doctrine concerning time, place, and manner
regulations developed in cases principally involving freedom of
speech in a public forum,'8 3 the principles should apply equally
181. When the law regulates speech, the law must be content neutral. See Young v.American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63, 67 n.27 (1976); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §
12-2, at 580-82. Similarly, when the law regulates religious conduct, the law should regu-
late only the secular aspects of the conduct, without reference to the religious tenets that
prompted the conduct.
182. United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1983); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-80 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
183. See generally CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 973-88.
Closely related to the limitations on government's management power over a public
forum are the limitations on government's control over conduct that includes symbolic
speech. Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78-79 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (applying the four-part O'Brien test to a zoning regulation because, like the
time, place, and manner cases cited, the regulation imposed only an incidental burden on
speech). Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (four-part test for
propriety of regulations applying to "nonspeech" connected with symbolic speech) with
United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (1983) (similar standards for valid time,
place, and manner regulations in a traditional public forum). See generally CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 988-96 (discussing the first amendment's protection of sym-
bolic speech).
When a party claims that his act is protected symbolic speech, the distinction
between protected speech-conduct and unprotected nonspeech-conduct, although often
unclear, see L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-7, ultimately must be based upon whether the
law aims at communicative impact or at noncommunicative impact. See id. § 12-2, at
580. But see Schlag, supra note 37, at 676-77. Of course, determining what conduct asso-
ciated with the exercise of religion is or is not protected by the first amendment must be
achieved by a method different from the objective method used to distinguish symbolic
speech from conduct. The determination of what is religious conduct is a subjective one
that ultimately depends only upon whether the religious practitioner sincerely attaches
religious significance to the regulated conduct itself. See United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86 (1944). This difference in analysis reflects the difference in the values pro-
tected by the free speech clause and the free exercise clause. In protecting speech, the
goal is to protect the flow of ideas. Although the ideas may differ, and although the
purposes for and proper manner of protecting the flow of ideas may be debated, see, e.g.,
Emerson, supra note 81, at 877-86, questions of whether the communication of ideas is
disrupted generally may be treated similarly, and therefore objectively. The free exercise
clause, however, was designed to protect the exercise of religion, and thus the question
whether a religious practice is disrupted must be answered by reference to the practi-
tioner's subjective religious tenets. See Bird, supra note 102, at 131. Once the protected
cores of speech and of the exercise of religion are identified, however, the same approach
should be used in both instances for protecting the core activity from unnecessary inci-
dental burdens by limiting regulation of the peripheral activities. See infra note 187 and
accompanying text. See, e.g., Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 737 (11th Cir.
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to regulations of the exercise of religion.'" The Supreme Court
historically has applied the time, place, and manner analysis to
1983).
Even when conduct accompanying symbolic speech is characterized as nonspeech,
the regulation of that conduct is subject to limitations because of the regulation's inci-
dental restrictions upon protected speech. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61, 68 n.7 (1981). When religious conduct is intertwined with conduct of no inde-
pendent religious significance, the peripheral aspects of religious conduct should be par-
tially protected to protect the core religious conduct, just as nonspeech-conduct is par-
tially protected in order to protect the symbolic speech-conduct from incidental burdens.
In both cases the reason for protecting the peripheral conduct is to prevent unnecessary
burdens on the core activities and to guard against oppressive, covert discrimination in
the law's administration. See CONsTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 977. See also supra
notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
184. See Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections
on Recent Cases, 9 N. Ky. L. REv. 265, 276 n.56 (1982). See, e.g., Grosz v. City of Miami
Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 739-41 (11th Cir. 1983); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655
P.2d 1293, 1300-01 (Alaska 1982); Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County,
45 Or. App. 1065, 1072-73, 610 P.2d 273, 277 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902
(1981). In Braunfeld v. Brown, the Supreme Court seemingly approved of using a time,
place, and manner mode of analysis for those indirect burdens that do not amount to a
burden on religion that requires strict scrutiny:
[I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the
purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals [and not to
impede the observance of one or all religions or invidiously to discriminate
between religions], the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do
not impose such a burden. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, [310 U.S. 296, 304-05
(1940)] ...
366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). In the cited portion of the Cantwell opinion, the Court, after
stating that legislation aimed at a legitimate end must not unduly infringe upon religious
freedom, stated that general and nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner regulations
might be proper. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304. The Braunfeld Court also cited two deci-
sions where the Court struck down ordinances that "required religious colporteurs to pay
a license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities because the State's interest,
the obtaining of revenue, could be easily satisfied by imposing this tax on nonreligious
sources." Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607 n.4 (citing Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S.
573 (1944) and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)). See also McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462-63 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (opinion applying to
Braunfeld). A careful reading of Follett and Murdock shows that those cases struck
down license taxes as prior restraints on the exercise of religion, focusing on the nature
rather than the substantiality of the tax, and without concern over alternative methods
for obtaining municipal revenues. See Follett, 321 U.S. at 577-78; Murdock, 319 U.S. at
112-14; id. at 118 (Reed, J., dissenting); and id. at 134-35 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Accord, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct.
1365, 1373 n.9 (1983). Nevertheless, the Braunfeld restatement of Murdock and Follett
appears to indicate that the Braunfeld Court thought more than minimum scrutiny
should be used to test laws that have substantial, incidental effects on religious practices.
See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963). Thus, the Braunfeld Court
required generally applicable laws that impose incidental burdens on religion to be more
narrowly drawn than would be required under a minimum scrutiny standard. 366 U.S. at
607-09.
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laws that regulate both speech and religious activities.1 85 By this
approach, the Court has recognized that the exercise of religion
is, like speech, a form of expression,86 and that the regulation of
both types of expressive activity should be treated similarly. The
Supreme Court also has analyzed first amendment claims with-
out distinguishing among the several clauses, "indicating that
the various first amendment protections should be construed
uniformly .... "187
The policy of protecting first amendment values that limits
government's ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of
speech in a public forum 8 8 should also limit government regula-
tion of conduct at the periphery of the core religious practice.1 89
In a public forum, government holds the property in trust for
the benefit of society, subject to the first amendment's limita-
tions on government's power to manage the forum. 190 Govern-
ment generally may not aim its regulations at the communica-
tive aspects of speech, but may regulate the noncommunicative
impact of the speech in order to preserve the general public's
enjoyment of the property.' 91 Thus, in a public forum, govern-
ment generally may limit the time, place, and manner of speech
to prevent harm to the public associated with the speech when
the harm does not derive from the viewpoint expressed.192 At the
185. E.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395, 405-08 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-78 (1941); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1940).
186. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269, 276 (1981). See generally A.
Cox, FREEDOM or ExPRwssloN 1-2 (1980) (discussing freedom of expression as the com-
mon value protected by the first amendment clauses). Cf. Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 659 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-08 (1940).
187. Bird, supra note 102, at 130 n.18A. See also, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1370-71 (1983); Schad v. Borough
of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68-71 (1981); Democratic Party of the United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403-07 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-31 (1944).
188. See generally CoNsTrrTrmONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 977-83.
189. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
190. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 954-55
(1983). See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (dictum). The scope of the first
amendment's limitations in a public forum varies with the degree to which the govern-
ment property serves as a forum for public expression. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 103 S. Ct.
at 954-55.
191. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 954-55
(1983); L. TRmE, supra note 3, §§ 12-2, -20.
192. See L. TRIE, supra note 3, §§ 12-2, -20. When the harm to be prevented
derives from the speech itself, the speech may be restricted only to prevent a clear and
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same time, the regulations must be carefully designed not to
intrude upon the protected communicative aspects of speech. 195
Because government has a duty to accommodate speech in the
forum,9 the regulations imposing incidental restrictions on the
communicative aspects of speech must bear a substantial rela-
tionship to a significant legitimate governmental interest.1 95
As it does with its proprietary claims in a public forum, the
state claims certain property rights when it exercises its police
power over private property. 96 When private property is used
for the exercise of first amendment rights, including the practice
of religion, government's police power claim to private rights
may be limited by the first amendment, just as government's
proprietary rights are limited by first amendment rights to a
public forum.1 97 If the regulation is not aimed at aspects of the
property having independent religious significance to the reli-
gious practitioner, 9" the first amendment's limitations on the
police power need only protect the practitioner from the regula-
tion's incidental burdens. 199 Like the limitations on govern-
ment's power to control noncommunicative aspects of speech
when managing a public forum for the public good, 00 the limita-
tions on the police power for the protection of first amendment
rights against incidental burdens need not be great. In such
cases the police power controls over private property, like the
time, place, and manner regulations of speech in a public forum,
need only be carefully formulated substantially to further a sig-
present danger or "imminent lawless action." See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108
(1973) (per curiam) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)
and citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1983).
193. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
194. Although commentators disagree whether the government's duty to accommo-
date speech in a public forum requires an affirmative, minimum access guarantee or
merely a policy of nondiscrimination in allowing access, see generally Note, The Public
Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REv.
117 (1975), a recent decision appears to have imposed at least a limited affirmative duty
to allow access to forums that are, by tradition, forums for public communication. See
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 954-55 (1983).
195. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
196. See Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 82-83 (1946); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
197. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text, supra note 183, and infra note
217.
199. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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nificant government interest and to minimize the potential for
abuse in their administration.2 1
This time, place, and manner analysis provides a reasona-
ble, intermediate approach to balancing the state's legitimate
police power interests against the needs of religious practitioners
to be free from unnecessary obstacles to their religious expres-
sion.2 0 2 Recognizing that the goal of this balancing of interests is
mutual accommodation, 0 3 this intermediate approach avoids the
often outcome-determinative choice between strict scrutiny and
minimal scrutiny.2 4 In addition, this approach provides an
objective method of analysis that reduces the danger that
facially neutral regulations will covertly be used to discriminate
against particular religions.205
201. See id.; Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 641 (1981); CoNsTrrTUTIoNA LAW, supra note 3, at 977.
202. Some state courts have recognized the need for an intermediate approach to
balancing these interests. These courts have found that zoning regulations are unreason-
able and thus violate due process when churches are wholly excluded from residential
districts. See Comment, Zoning the Church: Toward a Concept of Reasonableness, 12
CONN. L. REV. 571, 575-76 and nn.14-15 (1980); Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 377, § 2, at 380-81
(1960). By presuming that a zoning ordinance is arbitrary when it excludes churches
from residential districts, these courts in effect provide an intermediate standard of
review for a limited class of religious property uses.
203. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4318-19 (1984); City of Sumner v.
First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 639 P.2d 1358, 1366 (1982) (Utter, J., concur-
ring); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-4. See generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
259-61 (1981); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952); Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 624 (1942) (Black, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
204. One of the problems with the two-tiered review that generally is used by courts
resolving free exercise cases is that a court is put to a choice between scrutiny that is
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact. . . [and scrutiny that is] minimal ... in theory and
virtually none in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 n.* (1976) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring) (acknowledging this intermediate scrutiny standard). It likely was this
harsh choice that led the First Baptist Church court to choose strict scrutiny, and which
led Justice Williams to advocate some form of intermediate scrutiny. See First Baptist
Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 15-16, 639 P.2d at 1366-67 (Williams, J., concurring).
Strict scrutiny protection still is available, however, when the regulatory scheme vio-
lates a sect's fundamental tenets by substantially infringing upon nonsecular aspects of
the religious practice. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
205. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 649 (1981). Although laws might be subject to discriminatory enforcement, that is a
different matter. The concern in scrutinizing a time, place, and manner regulation is that
the law itself is drafted to reduce the likelihood and the possible extent to which the
regulation could be misused in oppressing a protected interest. See Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972). In addition, an ascertainable standard prevents a regulatory ordi-
646 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 7:607
Sumner's building code satisfies the criteria for a valid time,
place, and manner regulation. First, the code does not discrimi-
nate between similar secular and religious uses.2 0  Rather, the
code's standards change according to the intensity and character
of the building's use.2 ° Second, the code significantly furthers a
substantial governmental interest. Both the Church and the city
agreed that making the building safe for conducting the Acad-
emy was important,208 and the government's interest in protect-
ing the safety of children has been repeatedly articulated in case
law.2 09 Third, the code is narrowly drawn and is not subject to
arbitrary application. Although the Church argued that many of
the required building code standards were highly technical,210
the standards were promulgated by experts in a detached set-
ting, 1 and reflect commonly accepted levels of risk.
212 Of
nance from effectively banning the religious practice by causing uncertainty about what
conduct is proscribed, and thereby intimidating individuals to forego conduct of uncer-
tain legality. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
206. Under the building code, the religious nature of a building use does not deter-
mine the building use's classification. See BUILDING CODE, supra note 2, § 402, passim.
207. See generally BUILDING CODE, supra note 2, §§ 402, 501, passim. This is a
valid, nondiscriminatory classification scheme. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648-49 (1981); Abram v. City of Fayetteville,
281 Ark. 63, -, 661 S.W.2d 371, 372-73 (1983); Damascus Community Church v. Clack-
amas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 1073, 610 P.2d 273, 277 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450
U.S. 902 (1981).
208. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 16, at 31; Brief of Respondent, supra note
21, at 29-30.
209. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) (state may intervene
between parents and child to prevent injury to child's health or safety, even in contra-
vention of parents' religious guidance); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70
(1944) (upheld enforcement of child labor laws in contravention of child's guardian's
religious guidance); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F. Supp. 488, 504-
05 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (requiring child's blood transfusion contrary to parents' religious
beliefs), affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
210. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 4, 639 P.2d at 1360.
211. See BUILDING CODE, supra note 2, at 5. But see C. FIELD & S. RiviN, supra
note 171, at 35, 41-42, 100-01; S. SEIDEL, supra note 175, at 77-81, and Rivkin, Courting
Change: Using Litigation to Reform Local Building Codes, 26 RumrERs L. REv. 774, 774-
81 (1973) (building code standards are subject to significant influence by building mater-
ials manufacturers and trade associations).
212. Risk averseness varies from one individual to another, and what is an optimal
level of safety cannot be objectively determined. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 175, at 74,
306. Nevertheless, building codes serve as approximations of commonly accepted safety
levels. Uniformity of application, in turn, accustoms consumers to particular levels of
safety, which may then become expected. Building codes also serve to internalize the
costs of a building that, without the code, would be born by parties other than the prop-
erty owner. See S. SEIDEL, supra note 175, at 74. But see Oster & Quigley, Regulatory
Barriers to the Diffusion of Innovation: Some Evidence From Building Codes, 8 BELL J.
ECON. 361, 364 (1977).
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course, the code's requirements are not absolute; the code itself
provides for exceptions, 13 and for discretion in its enforce-
ment.2 " But this discretion does not necessarily subject the code
to arbitrary application. The community's experience in similar
building code applications should provide a basis for identifying
which code provisions are unnecessary in a particular case.2 1
Requiring that the code's highly specific standards be applied in
a consistent manner prevents the unbridled discretion that
would render the law constitutionally defective.21 6 Fourth, the
building code does not, by its terms, prohibit the Church from
operating the Academy.21 7
213. See, e.g., BUILDING CODE, supra note 2, § 104(g), quoted in First Baptist
Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 11, 639 P.2d at 1364; id. § 106 (allowing use of alternate materi-
als and methods of construction when approved by the building official).
214. See, e.g., BUILDING CODE, supra note 2, §§ 202, 302(a), 501. Discrimination in
the enforcement of a building code is a danger because few buildings strictly comply with
the code, and thus the reasonableness of the code provisions depends to an extent upon
the fairness of the official who is administering the law. Sometimes an administrative
official's bias may affect his perspective in enforcing the code. See, e.g., S. SEIDEL, supra
note 175, at 86-88. And because typically the official's determination is given great dis-
cretion, a minimal review of building code applications may have the same effect as vest-
ing broad discretion in an administrator. See generally supra note 205. But this concern
is not a defect in the code; rather, this concern should indicate to courts that a closer
review should be given to the application of building codes to religious property uses,
assuring that de facto standards for applying the regulations, established by similar
applications, have been followed in the case being reviewed. See infra note 226.
215. Reference to similar applications uses the standards for safety that have come
to be expected in the community; a significant variation from those standards would
suggest discrimination in the code's enforcement. Cf. Lubavitch Chabad House v. City of
Evanston, 112 Ill. App. 3d 223, -, 445 N.E.2d 343, 347 (1982) (discriminatory enforce-
ment of zoning ordinance found where Church satisfied requirements for special use per-
mit and only difference between the Church and other approved churches was in doctri-
nal matters), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 485 (1983). The First Baptist Church court
emphasized the strict manner in which the city had enforced its building code and zon-
ing ordinance. See 97 Wash. 2d 1, 4-10, 639 P.2d 1358, 1360-63 (1982). Thus, the First
Baptist Church court might properly have required strict scrutiny of the Sumner ordi-
nances as applied if their uncompromising enforcement amounted to discrimination. See
infra note 226.
216. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969). See also
supra note 205 and accompanying text.
217. Neither the building code nor the zoning ordinance regulated any land or
building characteristic that, by itself, was of religious significance to the Church. The
building code regulated the manner in which the Academy was conducted, and the zon-
ing ordinance regulated the place where it was conducted. Accord, Lakewood, Ohio Con-
gregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293,
1299-1300 (Alaska 1982); Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, -, 661 S.W.2d 371,
372-73 (1983); Hough v. North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 783-84, 312
N.W.2d 158, 159-60 (1981). In contrast, a building regulation or zoning ordinance could
conflict with religious values themselves. Cf. Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal
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Similarly, Sumner's zoning ordinance, under which the
Church was denied a permit to operate the Academy, also is a
valid time, place, and manner regulation. The ordinance is
facially nondiscriminatory1 8 and significantly furthers the sub-
Auth., 181 Colo. 411, 418-20, 509 P.2d 1250, 1254 (1973) (eminent domain proceeding
involving Pillar of Fire faith's structure, claimed to be sui generis because of unique
historical and symbolic importance to the faith, raised first amendment issues requiring
balancing test). Compare Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 742-45 (D.C. Cir.) (development
of public lands did not violate the free exercise clause where land did not play an indis-
pensible role in Indians' religious practices), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 371 (1983), with
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 594-95 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) (Forest Service plan to develop part of national forest violated religious free-
dom of Indians for whom the land played a central role in the practice of their religion).
See generally Comment, Raising the Free Exercise Clause Against Urban Renewal:
Subaltern Status for Planners?, 8 URBAN L. ANN. 219 (1974) (discussing Pillar of Fire).
In some respects every church or church school, including their respective locations,
might be considered sui generis to the congregation using the property. See id. at 221
n.11. Cf. Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 179 (1975). The Colorado courts were unwilling to adopt this position, however.
After Pillar of Fire was remanded to the trial court, that court held that the Church had
not proved that its structure was sui generis. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that
decision. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Pillar of Fire, 191 Colo. 238, 240-41, 552 P.2d
23, 24-25 (1976).
218. The zoning ordinance's use of the terms "church" and "parochial school" in its
classification scheme did not discriminate among religious uses on the basis of content.
The general rule in construing a zoning ordinance is that the nature of the use rather
than the nature of the using organization should control the interpretation. See Twin-
City Bible Church v. Zoning Bd. of App., 50 Ill. App. 3d 924, 927, 365 N.E.2d 1381, 1383-
84 (1977); Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 1087, § 2(a), at 1091 (1975); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 197, §
2(a), at 201 (1975). Although the terms "church" and "parochial school" may, for first
amendment issues, take on the broad meaning given to the term "religion," see supra
note 106, those terms have a narrow meaning in zoning ordinances, a meaning developed
in case law and tied to legislative intent. See Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63,
-, 661 S.W.2d 371, 372 (1983). See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 14 (1976); Annot., 62
A.L.R.3d 197 (1975). By placing public, private, and parochial schools in the same classi-
fication, ZONING ORDINANCE, supra note 5, § 11.16.180(a)(1), the ordinance is facially
nondiscriminatory. See Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 14, § 5(b) (1976). Thus, the terms "church"
and "parochial school" are not impermissible content-based classifications, but describe
objectively determinable activities; this classification scheme, aimed at regulating the
peripheral, secular aspects of traditional religious land uses, is valid. Hough v. North
Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 784-85, 312 N.W.2d 158, 160 (1981); Antrim
Faith Baptist Church v. Commonwealth, - Pa. Commw. -, -, 460 A.2d 1228, 1230-
31 (1983); See Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065,
1073, 610 P.2d 273, 275-77 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981). Cf. Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63-72 (1976) (city may distinguish between
"adult" movie theaters and other theaters in its zoning ordinance because of the differ-
ences in the effects of the respective theaters on their neighborhood environments).
By this same reasoning, the court should have rejected outright the Church's argu-
ment that, because the Academy was doctrinally inseparable from the Church, the Acad-
emy was a church use rather than a parochial school under the zoning ordinance and
building code. See First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 13, 639 P.2d at 1365.
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stantial governmental interests underlying zoning ordinances.2 "
Although the ordinance gives the Planning Commission discre-
tion to decide whether to allow a parochial school to operate
within a residential district, that discretion is limited to consid-
erations of land use regulation.2 20 Finally, the ordinance does not
prevent parochial schools from operating in the community.221
Thus, Sumner's zoning ordinance and building code both satis-
fied the constitutional requirements for statutes that regulate
the time, place, and manner of exercising first amendment
freedoms.
By using, this intermediate standard of review, the court still
could have shielded the Academy from unnecessarily harsh regu-
lations,22 and could have prevented "the more covert forms of
discrimination that may result when arbitrary discretion is
219. One stated purpose of the zoning ordinance was "the protection and promotion
of public health, safety, and general welfare." ZONING ORDINANCE, supra note 5, §
11.04.020. The Supreme Court often has recognized the importance of a city's power to
zone for the public interest. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68
(1981). Accord, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 560 (1981) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (concepts of federalism require special deference in limiting a commu-
nity's zoning power). The zoning power allows a city to regulate even protected activities.
Schad, 452 U.S. at 75. The permit system provided by the Sumner ordinance could, if
properly applied, significantly further the city's interest in assuring that activities within
a district are not "basically incompatible with the normal activity" in the district. Id.
220. The limitations on the City Planning Commission's authority to deny the per-
mit request are specified in ZONING ORDINANCE, supra note 5, § 11.16.190. That section
provides that the planning commission, in granting a special property use, is to be
guided by considerations of whether the use requested is within the intent of the ordi-
nance, whether the use is in the public interest, and whether the use will not damage
adjacent property by decreasing its value, creating excessive noise, or creating hazards or
other nuisances. A similar ordinance was upheld against a free exercise claim in Damas-
cus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 1068-69, 610 P.2d 273,
274-75 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981). However, the court still could have
determined whether the Planning Commission used the specified criteria in rejecting the
Church's permit request, rather than illegitimately rejecting the request because of
neighbor opposition. See supra note 21. Cf. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121-23 (1928) (ordinance, permitting philanthropic property use
only with the consent of the owners of two-thirds of the neighboring property, held arbi-
trary and in violation of due process).
221. The city is free, under the first amendment, to limit or even prohibit parochial
schools in residential districts, as long as the effect is not to deny the schools reasonable
access to the community. See Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc.
v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983);
Seward Chapel, Inc., v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1299-1301 (Alaska 1982). Cf.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). However, such a limitation
might be considered unreasonable, and therefore violative of due process. See supra note
202. Excluding the schools from the entire community would violate the free exercise
clause. Cf. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-77 (1981).
222. See First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d at 9, 639 P.2d at 1363; supra note 132.
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vested in some governmental authority. ' 223 Although discrimina-
tory enforcement would have remained a possibility,2 4 the free
exercise and equal protection clauses225 were available to prevent
the city from administering its laws with an uneven hand.2 2
223. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
649 (1981).
224. See supra note 214. Decisions relating to the use of real estate for religious
purposes often evoke emotional responses, which may lead to discrimination in adminis-
tering a building code or deciding upon a special use permit application. Besides the
danger that administrative bodies or individuals will enforce a zoning ordinance in accor-
dance with their own biases, the ordinance's enforcement may be affected by the biases
of neighboring property owners. Neighborhood resistance toward unorthodox religious
activities is not uncommon. See, e.g., Menendez, Welcome to Rajneeshpuram, Oregon:
Where "God" Drives a Rolls-Royce and a Religious Civil War is Brewing, CHURCH &
STATE, Oct. 1983, at 4-7 (conflict between citizens of Antelope, Oregon and an Indian
guru's commune, incorporated as the City of Rajneeshpuram, has developed into a bitter
legal conflict over land-use laws); Comment, Zoning the Church: Toward a Concept of
Reasonableness, 12 CONN. L. REV. 571, 574 n.8 (1980); Comment, Zoning Ordinances,
Private Religious Conduct, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 786,
786-88 nn.1-7 (1981).
225. The federal and state constitutional provisions expressly protecting religion are
quoted at supra note 3. Discrimination on the basis of religion generally violates the free
exercise clause. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-10 (1963).
In addition, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12
provides: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen . . . privileges or immunities
which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens .. " The state and
federal equal protection provisions have been similarly construed. Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8
Wash. 2d 360, 374, 112 P.2d 522, 529 (1941). The Supreme Court has indicated that
religious classifications generally are unjustified and therefore violate the equal protec-
tion clause. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). However, as a practical matter,
a claim of religious discrimination would normally be analyzed solely as a free exercise
claim. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 816-18.
226. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). However, proving invidious
discrimination against religion in the enforcement of a law may be difficult. See Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977). Sim-
ply showing inequality in the enforcement of the law usually will not be sufficient. Id. at
266; State v. Nixon, 10 Wash. App. 355, 358, 517 P.2d 212, 214 (1973). Unlike race or
gender, religious beliefs and practices are so diverse that often they do not fit into dis-
creet categories for purposes of showing a pattern of discrimination. And as a practical
matter, a zoning district may not have enough comparable property uses to show dis-
crimination in a particular case.
Nevertheless, proving a significant variation from the usual manner of enforcement
may indicate invidious discrimination in the application of the zoning ordinance or
building code. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 266-67. The First Baptist
Church court emphasized the strict manner in which the city had enforced its building
code and zoning ordinance. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 4-10,
639 P.2d 1358, 1360-63 (1982). If the city's uncompromising enforcement of the Sumner
ordinances amounted to discrimination against religion, the court would have been cor-
rect in finding a burden on religion that required a strict scrutiny standard of review. Cf.
Lubavitch Chabad House v. City of Evanston, 112 Ill. App. 3d 223, -, 445 N.E.2d 343,
347 (1982) (discriminatory enforcement of zoning ordinance violated free exercise
First Baptist Church
Admittedly a church's suit will not succeed as often under a
time, place, and manner analysis as it would under a strict scru-
tiny standard of review.2 7 However, to require a particularized
review whenever government, acting within its legitimate sphere
of authority, incidentally affects the special religious practices of
an individual or a group would lead to anarchy,2 8 and possibly
to a dilution in the protection now accorded the central compo-
nents of religious practices.22 A secular government, by defini-
tion, has a limited duty and capacity to accommodate religious
practices.23 By using the Constitution to attack those limits,
some religious organizations may temporarily gain advantage.
But these temporary gains may ultimately place religious free-
dom in jeopardy; in attempting to avoid the harshness of gener-
ally applicable laws in a secular society, those religious adher-
ents may find their freedoms lost through dilution with less
important interests, or through entanglement with
government.2 31
VII. CONCLUSION
Neither Sumner's zoning ordinance nor its building code
infringed upon the religious freedom of the members of the First
Baptist Church of Sumner.2 32 Thus, the Washington Supreme
Court should not have required a strict scrutiny review of those
laws which, as applied, only incidentally burdened the practice
of religion.23 s The court should have upheld the laws as valid
time, place, and manner regulations, and should have only
required the trial court to determine whether the ordinances had
clause), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 485 (1983).
227. See supra note 226.
228. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) ("the very concept of
ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of
conduct in which society as a whole has important interests."); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 606-09 (1961). Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 656-57
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (requiring individualized treatment often is impractical,
particularly when administrative discretion is essential to the regulatory scheme).
229. Requiring strict scrutiny of laws that only incidentally impact a religious prac-
tice could dilute the protections currently given to the core of religious practices by
increasing the hardship to society of accommodating religious practices. Cf. supra notes
81-110 and accompanying text.
230. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1982); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 606 (1961); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
231. See supra notes 156-78 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 50-155 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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been applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. When laws such as
the Sumner ordinances only incidentally burden a religious prac-
tice, applying those laws in a uniform, nondiscriminatory man-
ner minimizes church-state conflicts and best protects the cher-
ished religious liberty that is guaranteed t9 us by the
Constitution.'"
Philip R. Meade
234. See supra notes 156-78, 202-05 and accompanying text.
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